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Alexis de Tocqueville is widely hailed as one of the most insightful students of 
democracy and as one of the most perceptive observers of America. While this high 
praise is fully deserved, Tocqueville was more than simply the author of Democracy in 
America. Indeed, he completed the journey that inspired his seminal work before he was 
out of his twenties. The remainder of his life was devoted to the practice of politics. Both 
as an involved citizen and as a member of the Chamber of Deputies, Tocqueville 
researched and wrote extensively on French foreign policy. His most notable works are 
several reports endorsing French colonial projects in Algeria and articles advocating for 
the emancipation of slavery in the French Caribbean colonies. In this essay I argue that 
one cannot truly understand Tocqueville the student without analyzing Tocqueville the 
politician. Approaching his career as a consistent whole, rather than two distinct and 
incongruous parts, opens new avenues of investigation into his works. First, his incisive 
examination and critique of the distinct mildness engendered by equality of conditions in 
America helps fill several theoretical gaps in the democratic peace research program. 
Second, his arguments in support of both French imperial enterprises as well as the 
emancipation of slaves reveals that his diplomatic career was animated above all by the 
desire to forestall the further proliferation of this democratic mildness, which he viewed 
as one of democracy’s most dangerous vices. Examining his foreign policy positions in 
light of the lessons he learned in writing Democracy in America is the only way to 
discover the consistent goal of his life—namely, to educate and guide the future 
generations of democracy—and thus to understand Tocqueville as he understood himself. 
 v 
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In 1798 the German Enlightenment philosopher, Immanuel Kant, offered the 
following forecast of the future trajectory of world history: “Gradually violence on the 
part of the powers will diminish and obedience to the laws will increase.” There will arise 
within each country more charity and trustworthiness, he explained, “and eventually this 
will also extend to nations in their external relations toward one another up to the 
realization of the cosmopolitan society, without the moral foundation in mankind having 
to be enlarged in the least.”1 This vision of the future put forward by Kant is at the core of 
two contemporary topics, or themes, in international relations scholarship—the 
democratic peace research program and modern liberal foreign policy. In this paper I will 
examine these two legacies Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) from the perspective of the 
writings and diplomatic career of Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859). Although I will 
focus on these two Kantian traditions as they have appeared to us since World War I (i.e., 
well after the death of Tocqueville), I will demonstrate that the works of Tocqueville, 
insofar as they were animated by an ardent desire to understand and guide “the great 
democratic revolution”2 of his time, offer a unique perspective on Kant’s profound effect 
on both the practice of, as well as the theorizing about, politics in the modern era.  
 
In the first half of this essay I will demonstrate how Tocqueville’s analysis of the 
effects of equality help fill the theoretical gap in the current literature regarding the causal 
mechanism of the empirical finding that “democracies are significantly unlikely to fight 
                                                 
1 Immanuel Kant, “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly 
Progressing?” in Immanuel Kant: The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary J. Gregor 
(New York: Abaris Book, Inc., 1979), 165-6.  
2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Eduardo Nolla, trans. James T. Schleifer 





one another.”3 Tocqueville explains, in his seminal work, Democracy in America, that 
equality of conditions causes mores to become milder and, by destroying all aristocratic 
boundaries, directs man’s natural feeling of sympathy to extend beyond one’s borders to 
“the human species [now seen] as a single whole.”4 I will begin this section by 
conducting a survey of the leading international relations literature on the democratic 
peace, focusing especially on the debate over the causal mechanisms. Because this paper 
is not an independent, original study of the philosophy of Kant, but rather an examination 
of his legacy, in the literature review I will make note where appropriate of the principal 
similarities and differences between the contemporary democratic peace research 
program and the theories of the man often identified as its founder. The literature review 
will end with a close analysis of John M. Owen’s Liberal Peace, Liberal War,5 in which 
Owen, despite providing a compelling theory of the democratic peace, ultimately leaves 
unexplained the theoretical connections between liberalism’s account of human nature, 
its theoretical appreciation and respect for a variety of notions of the good life, and its 
tendency in practice to value only “the ordinary life.” It is precisely this ambiguity that, 
with the help of Tocqueville, I will help clarify, thereby illuminating how the liberal 
principles of peace and self-determination exercise their pacifying effect in the anarchic 
realm of international relations. 
 
The second half of this paper consists in an examination of Tocqueville’s 
diplomatic record in order to reveal some of the implications and problematic features of 
the second Kantian legacy, modern liberal foreign policy and its guiding ideology of 
“liberal internationalism.” Although not purely Kantian, liberal internationalism, has at 
its core and as its defining feature a U.S. president who was profoundly influenced by the 
Kant’s thought: Woodrow Wilson. In this section I will explain that, in stark contrast to 
                                                 
3 John M. Owen, “Democratic Peace Research: Whence and Whither?” International 
Politics 41 (2004), 605. 
4 Democracy, 838.  
5 John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca: 





Wilson’s Kantian-inspired foreign policy, Tocqueville did not believe the highest and 
most urgent task of the statesman to be the attempt to “discover means of moving toward 
and eventually bringing about ‘perpetual peace’ in a global ‘kingdom of ends’ that would 
reflect, if it does not instantiate, the universality of the moral law.”6 Instead, as his 
writings and speeches in support of the colonization of Algeria and the emancipation of 
slaves in the French West Indies demonstrate, Tocqueville saw foreign policy as remedy 




                                                 
6 Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and 









At its core the democratic peace research program is a dialogue amongst scholars 
and foreign policy makers alike concerning the proposition that democratic states are 
significantly unlikely to go to war with one another. I use the term “research program”—
an admittedly vague notion that could mean several different things—for good reason: it 
is impossible to categorize as a single theory, or capture in a unified paradigm, the 
various debates, studies, and policy decisions that have proceeded from this single 
proposition. There is not even consensus on the name: while some call it a democratic 
peace, others talk about the liberal peace. For this reason, it is helpful to begin a brief 
sketch of some theoretical and historical context.  
 
We call the contemporary democratic peace research program a “legacy” of 
Immanuel Kant thanks to Michael Doyle and his unique approach to investigating the 
notion that democratic states are peaceful only in relations with other democratic states. 
In order to understand the observable peace among democracies, Doyle argued, one must 
look back to a thinker who lived when liberal democracies were the exception rather than 
the rule. For Doyle, Kant offers the best guidance: 
 
“Perpetual Peace,” written in 1795, predicts the ever-widening pacification of the 
liberal pacific union, explains that pacification, and at the same time suggests why 
liberal states are not pacific in their relations with nonliberal states. Kant argues 
that Perpetual Peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of three 
“definitive articles” of peace.7 
 
                                                 
7 Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12:3 





The first of these articles, Doyle continues, holds that the civil constitution of all 
states in the pacific union must be republican. Kant himself offers the following 
explanation of his proposition the proliferation of representative government will 
facilitate the spread of peace: if “the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide 
whether there should be war or not, nothing is more natural than that those who would 
have to decide to undergo all the deprivations of war will very much hesitate to start such 
an evil game.”8 But, in Kant’s mind, is the government that derives its power and 
authority from the consent of the people the same as democracy in the strict sense, i.e., 
the rule of the demos or people?  
 
For Doyle and many others approaching this question from today’s perspective, the 
answer is yes: in his seminal essay Doyle asserts that Kant’s principle of republican 
government requires “democratic participation or representation.”9 However, this reading 
of Kant does not adequately take into account many somber subtleties that darken the 
otherwise relatively rosy picture of the German philosopher. On this point a single 
example will suffice: in the same essay, “Perpetual Peace,” Kant stresses that “democracy 
is necessarily a despotism,” because of its ineradicable vulnerability to majority tyranny, 
and therefore excluded from his definition of a republic.10 How then are we to reconcile 
this condemnation of democracy with Kant’s emphatic confidence in the pacifying 
effects of “representative government”?  
 
Pangle and Ahrensdorf (1999) offer a compelling answer. They argue that Kant was 
referring not to all republican regimes “but only to those large, modern, representative 
republics animated by the commercial spirit, where political participation is minimal and 
                                                 
8 Immanuel Kant, “Eternal Peace,” in The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant’s Moral 
and Political Writings, ed. and trans. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: The Modern Library, 
1949), 438. Note Friedrich’s alternate translation of the title of the essay. In the text I will 
refer to it as “Perpetual Peace.” 
9 Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” 207. 





most people’s lives are focused on individual prosperity, family life, culture, and private 
association.”11 The political society depicted here is much closer to the subject of analysis 
of most democratic peace research and resembles John M. Owen’s (1997) account of “the 
ordinary life” that naturally emerges from liberal theory. Why then is it called the 
democratic peace? Put differently, what accounts for the shift from Kant’s explicitly anti-
democratic vision for peace—undoubtedly animated by the historical lessons taught by 
such militaristic or imperialistic republics as Athens, Sparta, and Rome wherein rule by 
the demos allowed manipulative demagogues to lead the masses to destructive wars—and 
the contemporary debate over the premise that democratic states are significantly unlikely 
to go to war with one another?  
 
There are two principal components to answering this question, each of which forms 
a distinctive feature of democracy as it has emerged and spread across the world after 
being revived by the French Revolution. First, notwithstanding certain exceptions, the 
modern democratic trend has been decidedly liberal, meaning that popular sovereignty is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to classify a regime as democratic: the government must 
also place fixed limits on itself and its exercise of power. These limits, most often 
established through a constitution, are designed to protect individuals and their personal 
liberties. (This predominance of liberalism and its unique combination with democracy 
helps us understand why certain scholars talk about the liberal peace.) Second, unlike the 
ancient republics mentioned above, modern democracies are rooted firmly in the 
principle of universal equality, or the notion that the circumstances into which an 
individual is born ought not determine his place in society. This universal leveling of the 
formerly rigid hierarchy of society is what Tocqueville famously calls “equality of 
conditions” and is at the center of his understanding of democracy in America. On 
account of both its novelty as well as its strength in shaping the direction of democracy, 
this principle of comprehensive equality was the single most striking feature that 
Tocqueville witnessed during his journey. Equality of conditions was, he stressed, a 
                                                 





“primary fact” that exercised a “prodigious influence” on the “march of society; it gives a 
certain direction to the public mind, a certain turn to the laws; to those governing, new 
maxims, and particular habits to the governed.” It is this particular kind of democracy, 
unknown to the world for most of history, that the contemporary democratic peace 
research program  
 
Having thus clarified some of the basic theoretical underpinnings of the contemporary 
democratic research program, we can now turn to the “lively debate” over the premise 
that “democracies are significantly unlikely to fight one another.” For despite a general 
consensus on this proposition, what exactly causes the peace has remained in dispute: 
“The democratic peace remains a putative fact in want of a theory.”12 
  
What then are the competing theories put forward to explain this “fact”? In his 2004 
article Owen helpfully arranges democratic peace scholarship along three research 
dimensions: (1) testing the empirical validity of the central premise that democratic states 
are less likely to fight each other; (2) searching for the fundamental causal mechanisms of 
the observed peace; and (3) proposing and testing new hypotheses regarding the 
distinctive character of the way in which democracies behave in international relations. 
For the present purposes I am concerned only with the second of these three topics. That 
is, it is beyond the scope of this study to sufficiently account for or investigate other 
relevant topics that are undeniably crucial to any comprehensive understanding of the 
democratic peace research program; for instance, the hegemonic stability theory and 
those studies that investigate the particularly volatile nature of democratizing states.  
 
 Traditionally, the dominant way to conceptualize research on the causes of the 
observed peace between democracies is the normative-structural typology proposed by 
Maoz and Russett (1993). The search for causes was largely framed and directed by these 
two models: democratic states do not fight each other either because their shared norms 
                                                 





of compromise and cooperation preclude any conflicts that do arise from escalating into 
violence or because their unique domestic political institutions constrain the leaders such 
that violent conflict is unfeasible. 
 In a direct challenge to this scheme, Owen (1997) argues that norms and 
institutions are not independent variables, but rather intervening variables that work in 
tandem to produce the democratic peace. He thus offers an alternative typology that 
distinguishes between rationalist and constructivist explanations. What Owen calls the 
rationalist approach is to “take subjects’ ends as given and explain behavior via the 
external incentives they face, incentives that can supposedly be measured objectively” 
and are conceived as “structures, virtually material constraints whose meanings are self-
evident.”13 Put differently, rationalist explanations argue that war is irrational and that, as 
a consequence, in order to explain a war one must give an account of what prevented the 
two sides from rationally reaching a settlement to their dispute. In the case of peaceful 
relations between democracies, rationalism suggests that democratic states have 
particular features that enable them to negotiate or bargain relatively effectively. 
Common features cited in this tradition are Fearon’s (1994) notion of “audience costs,”14 
the high degree of transparency of democratic regimes, and the domestic vulnerability of 
democratic governments because of the ability of the public to hold elected officials 
accountable through regular elections (cf. Bueno de Mesquita, 1999).   
 
 Another way in which the contemporary democratic peace literature departs from 
(and is in tension with) Kant’s philosophy can be seen in some of the constructivist 
theories, most of which presuppose that democratic states have, or acquire over time, a 
distinctive interest in peace with each other that may lead them to develop psychological 
prejudices in one another’s favor. For example, following Hurrell (1990) and Huntley 
(1996), Lars-Erik Cederman argues that the Kantian perpetual peace will be achieved 
                                                 
13 Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War, 18. 
14 J.D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International 





through a process of learning or moral improvement. Peace “will emanate,” Cederman 
says, “from individuals’ realization that war is both destructive and immoral.”15 Yet as 
Pangle and Ahrensdorf emphasize, Kant himself was clearly doubtful about a promise of 
progress toward peace that rested primarily on a change in human intentions, through 
education, historical learning or otherwise. Rather than stressing what human beings may 
do to hasten the arrival of any future perpetual peace, Kant indicates that we are 
powerless to affect the “hidden plan of nature.” Moreover, the unfolding of this plan 
“seems to require so much time that from the small distance which man has so far 
traversed one can judge only uncertainly the shape of the revolution’s course and the 
relation of the parts to the whole.”16 
 
 This Kantian vision can be seen more clearly in the relatively new breed of 
democratic peace analysis that adopts a systemic orientation. Ewan Harrison (2010) 
explains the expository contributions of this literature: departing from the traditional 
dyadic orientation that understands the democratic peace as the “product of the internal 
properties of liberal states,” the systemic studies instead hypothesize that “the effects of 
the pacific union vary over time and with the strength of the democratic community.”17 
One such contribution is gained through the concept of the “spillover effect,” a process 
through which “the pacific union influences states that are not mature democracies.”18 
This theory holds that the pacifying effects of democracy are not static, monolithic, or 
derivative only of a state’s domestic political institutions, but rather depend largely on the 
strength of the democratic community at any given time. After a certain stage, or once a 
                                                 
15 Lars-Erik Cederman, “Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning 
Process,” American Political Science Review 95:1 (March, 2001), 16. 
16 Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent,” in The 
Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant’s Moral and Political Writings, ed. Carl J. Friedrich 
(New York: The Modern Library, 1949), 127. 
17 Ewan Harrison, “The democratic peace research program and system-level analysis,” Journal of Peace 
Research 47:2 (March, 2010), 155.  





sufficient number of countries are democratic, the pacific impact of democracy “spills 
over” beyond the boundaries of relations among liberal democratic states.  
If democratic spillover does occur—and it seems at least plausible that it does, 
especially if Harrison is correct that a democratic critical mass presently exists—it would 
tell us something about the causal mechanisms of the democratic peace, at least with 
respect to the normative-institutional debate. That is, setting aside the material benefits of 
an increasingly democratic global system that fledgling democracies may enjoy, it stands 
to reason that only norms, not domestic political institutions, could “spill over” from one 
country to the next. Notwithstanding any explanatory power gained by the theory of the 
spillover effect, it leaves unanswered the crucial (and logically antecedent) question: 
what exactly is spilling over and causing the observed outcome of increasing peaceful 
relations? Yet we must go further still: the spillover theory depends on the existence of a 
critical threshold of democratic states in the international system, a situation that has been 
the historical exception, not the rule. The question then becomes, before any “spilling 
over” was even possible, what was causing the relatively peaceful relations between 
liberal democracies? 
 
 In his book, Liberal Peace, Liberal War, John M. Owen provides a sound and 
persuasive theory to try to answer this question. Rooted in the familiar idea of 
“favoritism,” Owen emphasizes the way in which states’ perceptions of each other, even 
prior to any consequential engagement, predispose them to interact in a generally benign 
or a generally hostile manner. The power of perceptions is at the core of favoritism, i.e., 
the notion that people tend to approve of foreign states that have their preferred system of 
government, and to discriminate against those states that have a system of government 
that they consider to be dangerous in their own state. Consequently, one can predict fairly 
accurately a person’s attitude toward a foreign state based on whether or not that state 






Although human beings exhibit a general tendency to favor their own type across 
various dimensions—e.g., religious, ethnic, geographic, lingual—Owen argues that for 
the past two hundred years of Western history, starting from the French Revolution, 
loyalty to political systems has trumped all other identities. This loyalty is what he calls 
“institutional identity,” or identification with states according to their domestic political 
institutions.19 This form of favoritism, Owen correctly points out, is by no means a novel 
concept unique to modern political science or sociology. Although not the oldest 
expression of this idea, Tocqueville offers a particularly stirring articulation of the 
strength and tenacity of one’s institutional identity:  
 
When each nation has its separate opinions, beliefs, laws and customs, it 
considers itself as forming by itself the whole of humanity, and feels touched only 
by its own sufferings. If war comes to break out between two peoples so inclined, 
it cannot fail to be conducted with barbarism. 
At the time of their greatest enlightenment, the Romans cut the throats of 
enemy generals, after dragging them in triumph behind a chariot, and delivered 
prisoners to the beasts for the amusement of the people. Cicero, who raises such 
loud cries at the idea of a citizen crucified, finds nothing to say about these 
atrocious abuses of victory. It is clear that in his eyes a foreigner is not of the 
same human species as a Roman.20 
 
In terms of how this type of favoritism actually functions, Owen explains that it is 
predominantly a phenomenon among elites within states. Following James Rosenau, he 
calls these elites opinion leaders, or people “who occupy positions which enable them to 
regularly transmit, either locally or nationally, opinions about any issue.”21 In practice, 
not all elites within a country are led primarily by their institutional identity: the 
favoritism based on a country’s domestic political institutions then is a phenomenon 
among a particular subset of elites. And while various nation-states can join together to 
form leagues, institutional identities must be “based on one or another central 
                                                 
19 Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War, 24.  
20 Democracy, 994. 
21 James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation (New York: Random 





institutional criterion,” which is defined or chosen largely according to “the opposite of 
that institution thought to pose the biggest threat” to an individual’s, and thus to the 
nation’s, interests.22 That an individual, state, or group’s institutional identity is tied to a 
particular institutional criterion is critical to Owen’s theory, for he argues that variations 
in perceptions of foreign states proceed from variations in institutions. For example, if 
liberals in state A view state B as illiberal, they will reclassify B as liberal under one of 
two situations: “(1) state B’s institutions change to match the a priori criteria of the 
liberals in state A; or (2) state A’s liberals change their criteria—i.e., the institutions they 
want for their own state—such that B meets the new criteria.”23 The opposite is true if 
liberals in state A regard state B as liberal. The exact institutions with which Owen is 
concerned are those that instantiate the liberal principles of individualism and consent. 
He focuses on two such institutions: freedom of discussion and regular competitive 
elections.  
 
Although each case of bilateral state interaction is unique, Owen elaborates 
briefly on the ways in which actors will judge each other’s institutions as liberal or 
illiberal. Determining whether elections are competitive and regular is relatively 
straightforward. Ascertaining whether discussion is free, on the other hand, is more 
complicated. To measure this liberal institution then he examines the existence and 
strength of “constitutional rights that protect citizens from persecution for their opinions,” 
which include “freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, and religion, as well as equality 
before the law, no arrest without formal charges (habeas corpus), the right to a fair trial, 
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure, and the right to petition the state for 
redress of grievances” (42).  
 
At this point in his account, one could reasonably ask the following question: if it 
is true that people are predisposed to favor a foreign state if it has their preferred system 
                                                 
22 Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War, 39.  





of government, why do we see consistently peaceful relations between only liberal 
democratic states and not some other ideology? For Owen the answer lies in the peculiar 
content of liberalism. He defines liberalism as a “system of thought that seeks to uphold 
individual autonomy (i.e., self-legislation or self-government),” which theoretically could 
employ a number of different strategies to secure individual autonomy, for instance 
laissez-faire economics or an interventionist government like that of the New Deal 
programs (32). Whatever the particular shape, Owen stresses, liberals eschew violence in 
favor of peace and self-determination. Thus, unlike communism, fascism, Islamism, or 
any other ideology, liberalism cherishes above all else the principle of self-government 
while condemning intolerance and coercion. It is on account of these concurrent 
attachments to peace and individual autonomy that liberal favoritism enjoys a unique 
durability. In addition to the effects of the unique ideas of liberalism, Owen argues that 
its institutions also contribute to this tenacity of liberal favoritism.  
 
His institutional hypothesis is relatively straightforward: “During crises, the 
stronger liberal institutions are within a state, the more constrained its decision makers 
will be to follow policies advocated by its liberal elites” (59). Responding to the realist 
critique that the clever statesman will use rhetoric to manipulate the public into support 
for a war regardless of the adversary’s regime type, Owen here posits that the institutions 
of free discussion and elections will limit the government’s leverage and ability to control 
public opinion. By contrast, his ideological hypothesis, which constitutes the theoretical 
crux of his argument, is more complex. Using ideology as his independent variable, he 
proposes that “institutional identity motivates liberals to favor fellow liberal states and be 
hostile to illiberal states” (57). That is, a state’s domestic political institutions function as 
a signal of a particular ideology: state A’s perception of state B amounts to a judgment or 
interpretation of the particular ideology that state A associates with the domestic political 






Owen views this as a direct challenge to the traditional realist theories that give 
pride of place to the power of anarchy: without a system-wide authority capable of 
maintaining peaceful order over sovereign states with competing interests, realism argues 
that state behavior is driven primarily by the interminable process of threat and power 
assessments between states. According to Owen, anarchy is underdetermining when it 
comes to explaining state behavior; explanations that rely on the effect of the anarchic 
system do not adequately account for the power of perceptions based on ideology. To the 
extent that realists acknowledge any effect of ideology on state behavior, they claim that 
it is merely invoked as a rhetorical tool to justify whatever action had already been 
chosen based purely on power and threat calculations. In addressing these shortcomings 
of realism, Owen unites ideology and threat assessment, arguing that states (or elites 
within states) view the actions of other states through “ideological prisms.” Thus, “liberal 
states are biased to interpret as friendly the actions of states they consider liberal, and 
unfriendly the actions of those they consider illiberal” (52). But what are the exact 
grounds of this liberal bias or assumption?  
 
To answer this question Owen begins by addressing a fundamental contradiction 
inherent in liberalism. Insofar as liberalism extols the self-governing individual, it is 
theoretically neutral on the question of ends—that is, it does not value any particular 
notion(s) of the good life at the exclusion of any others: “Individuals may choose the 
lives of heroism or hedonism, charity or acquisitiveness, so long as they respect others’ 
decision” (33). Yet, as Owen rightly observes, liberalism does in fact make normative 
judgments regarding the ends toward which human beings aspire. Intolerance and 
coercion, for example, are explicitly condemned in liberal societies. In explicating this 
apparent logical inconsistency, Owen appeals to the authority of Charles Taylor, who 
says that all worldviews (including liberalism) proceed from an account of human nature, 
which, at least implicitly, prescribes a particular vision of proper human ends. According 
to Owen’s explanation, the core of the liberal account of human nature is that all men are 





From this fundamental equality emerges the essence of the liberal vision of the proper 
human ends: each individual is free to choose and pursue his own notion of the good life 
so long as it respects the autonomy of others and their ability to make their own choice 
regarding the kind of life they will lead. Thus, liberalism calls for “self-government that 
respects the self-government of others [and therefore] rules out a coercive or violent life” 
(33-5). Yet, Owen hastens to add, liberal societies have tended in practice to posit a much 
more limited vision of the good life. Again following Charles Taylor, Owen calls the 
human end that predominates in liberal society “the ordinary life”:  
 
Many civilizations have seen labor, household management, and even commerce 
as necessary evils, to be endured or foisted on inferior persons for the sake of 
higher goods such as heroism or spirituality. But from the seventeenth century 
onward Westerners have tended to see these everyday activities as intrinsically 
worthy. The importance of this modern end is seen when it is contrasted with 
alternative notions of ends. In Homer’s ancient Greece, for example, a ‘warrior 
ethic’ dominated (33-4). 
 
At this point two questions arise. First, why exactly does the liberal’s account of 
human nature, which describes man as fundamentally and equally autonomous, produce 
as the criteria for the good life the particular sort of personal autonomy that respects the 
independence of others and eschews violence? Second, if liberals can theoretically value 
lives devoted to a wide range of nonviolent ends—religious contemplation or self-
sacrifice among them—why has “the ordinary life” dominated so categorically in liberal 
societies?  
 
To the second question Owen offers no satisfactory explanation. Beyond noting 
briefly that history shows a significant and positive correlation between liberalism and 
the pursuit of material prosperity, his answer amounts to observing the difference 
between the theory and the practice of liberalism. With respect to the first question Owen 
provides the following answer. According to liberal theory, the fundamental equality 





with the same rational faculties through which they all will, “if properly educated and 
uncoerced,” conclude that the criteria of the good life is individual self-determination and 
respect for the autonomy of others. “Liberalism values voluntarism,” as Owen puts it, 
“but it can do so [precisely] because it assumes that free choice will yield not chaos or 
self-destruction but peace” (35, emphasis added). 
 
Yet the precise logic of this answer remains opaque. Owen does not tell us on 
what grounds, or for what reasons, the “Enlightenment thinkers who produced the liberal 
tradition” assumed that uncoerced “universal rationality” would necessarily result in 
societies that value peace and respect the autonomy of others (35). This ambiguity is by 
no means of little consequence to the strength of Owen’s theory. For if “the core of 
liberal peace … is liberalism itself,” and if “liberal persons highly value both peace and 
individual autonomy,” then the feature of liberalism on account of which individual 
autonomy yields peaceful outcomes would appear to be the critical causal mechanism of 
the pacifying effects of liberalism (5, 32). Put differently, Owen’s entire theory rests on 
the premise that liberals view foreign states with a preconceived notion of how liberal 
states behave: “Prima facie, they believe that, irrespective of physical capability, liberal 
states are safe and illiberal states potentially dangerous” (38). He makes this argument by 
projecting onto the relations between foreign states the liberal assumption that all human 
beings, on account of our natural equality of the mind, will choose a life of peace and 
mutual respect for all others who are also tolerant. However, without first clarifying the 
precise theoretical grounds of this liberal bias or assumption, the core of Owen’s theory 
will remain ambiguous. In the absence of a clear articulation of how liberalism functions 
within a state, Owen’s theory fails to explain adequately how exactly the liberal 
principles of peace and self-determination exercise their pacifying effect specifically in 
the anarchic realm of international relations. 
 
Now perhaps Owen would ultimately accept this critique, conceding that it was 





admit that his task was not the same as that of a “political philosopher” (32). Despite, or 
rather because, of this caveat, in order to understand the most fundamental causal 
mechanisms of the democratic peace, we will now turn to seek the guidance of Alexis de 
Tocqueville: a man who, if not a political philosopher, at least was animated throughout 
his life by his fervent desire to “discern clearly [democracy’s] natural consequences … its 
tendencies, its character, its prejudices, its passions … if only to know at least what we 
must hope or fear from it.”24  
 
A Tocquevillean Perspective on the Causal Mechanisms of the Democratic Peace 
 
Before we look closely at the writings and thought of Alexis de Tocqueville, it 
behooves me to offer a brief defense of my unique method of investigation and explain to 
the would-be critic the benefits of studying a man whose observations and experiences 
were limited to the nineteenth century when the object of inquiry is the contemporary 
democratic peace research program. Perhaps by present-day academic standards 
Tocqueville is considered “old” and his masterpiece, Democracy in America, is grouped 
among “the classics”; however, for two principle reasons, Tocqueville’s analysis of 
democracy as he witnessed it in America remains one of the most incisive and illustrative 
guides to understanding democracy and its effects, regardless of the specific topic.  
 
First, the democracy that he observed in America in 1831-32 was not only of the 
same modern, “enlightened” variety as that which emerged from the French Revolution, 
but it also existed under an inimitable set of circumstances that allowed it to develop with 
little resistance and in a way that revealed clearly the subtleties of its character. 
Collectively known as its “point of departure,” Tocqueville distills the distinctive 
character of America’s beginning into two primary facts: among the emigrants who first 
arrived on the continent, the idea of the inequality of men was virtually nonexistent, and 
                                                 





even in the rare cases that a hierarchy of ranks was imported from Europe, “the American 
soil absolutely rejected territorial aristocracy.”25 Forced to tame, and enticed to explore, 
the intractable frontier that made up the entire North American continent, the early 
settlers abandoned as a matter of practical necessity the inheritance of landed property 
based on the right of primogeniture.26 It is difficult to overstate the exceptional import 
Tocqueville ascribes to this fact: he devotes nearly his entire treatment of the social state 
of the Americans to explicating its consequences, which can be summed up in a single 
phrase, the equality of conditions. 
 
When property is not handed down wholly intact from one generation to the next, 
large estates cannot survive. After the death of the original landowner, the property is 
split up, a division that increases exponentially with the passage of each successive 
generation. Moreover, to the extent that the fortunes of individuals and families were tied 
directly to the possession of property, the equal division of land forces men to pursue 
wealth by other means: it is not that the rich cease to exist, but wealth begins to circulate 
“with incredible rapidity, and experience teaches that it is rare to see two generations reap 
the rewards of wealth” (85). As Tocqueville makes clear, however, far more important 
than these material consequences were the effects on the family. Laws based on 
primogeniture cause the “spirit” of a family—its “name, origin, glory, power and 
virtues”—to be embodied in, and perpetuated by, the land (81). Once inheritance is based 
on equal division, the land, inevitably divided, can no longer represent the family: the 
“family spirit,” and therewith the most powerful source of influence over an individual, 
necessarily erodes. The kind of society that results—what Tocqueville sees as the 
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archetypal democratic social state—is defined by equality of conditions: the absence of 
an aristocracy of birth, and the weakening of individual influence. 
 
If equality of conditions defines the social state of America, the key feature of its 
political regime is the principle of the sovereignty of the people. Indeed, the latter is a 
consequence of the former. But, as Tocqueville makes clear, the causal relationship is not 
a necessary one: “Now I know only two ways to have equality rule in the political world: 
rights must either be given to each citizen or given to no one.” For those with a social 
state based on equality of conditions, in other words, it is difficult to find “a middle 
course between the sovereignty of all and the absolute power of one man” (89). In 
Tocqueville’s view, the sovereignty of the people, and not the authority of a king, reigned 
supreme in America because of its point of departure: having renounced and left behind 
the kingships of Europe, the first emigrants held from the beginning the sovereignty of 
the people as a generative principle of their colonies.  
 
For Tocqueville, the essence of American democracy was embodied by these two 
principles: equality of conditions and the absolute sovereignty of the people. Insofar as 
the latter could not exist without the former, he saw the equality of conditions as 
preeminently influential: prevailing over civil society as well as government, “it creates 
opinions, gives birth to sentiments, suggests customs and modifies all that it does not 
produce” (4). Nevertheless, he considered both to be generative facts. Thus, the 
democracy that he studied, and from which he learned the lessons that will help guide the 
present study, resembled not the ancient militaristic and imperialistic democracies 
excluded from Kant’s pacific union, but instead the large commercial republics 
investigated by the contemporary democratic peace research program.  
 
The preceding discussion shows that Tocqueville had good reason to say that his 
account of America’s point of departure contained “the key to nearly the whole book” (4, 





distinctive character of America’s origins do not constitute the key to the entire book. 
This subtle hint leads us to the second reason that Tocqueville provides a useful 
perspective even on the contemporary democratic peace research program: above all else, 
Tocqueville was interested in understanding the nature of democracy and its effects 
independent of place. If this was his object of study, the ultimate purpose of his 
examination was to take back to France what he had learned from the American 
experience with democracy. Tocqueville observing democracy in America was akin to a 
scientist watching an experiment in a laboratory: separated from Europe by an ocean, and 
inhabiting a virtually unoccupied continent, America was the “only country” whose 
circumstances allowed the world to “witness the natural and tranquil development of a 
society” (47). Yet no matter how transfixed Tocqueville may have become by this great 
spectacle, he never lost sight of his mission. France, and the question of how best to 
avoid the vices and maximize the virtues of democracy, formed the lens through which 
he observed America. As he wrote from Connecticut in 1831 to a friend, the “greatest 
obstacle” to learning about America was “not knowing … what exists in France,” for 
“without comparisons to make, the mind does not know how to proceed.”27 Because 
Tocqueville conceived of his “principle subject” not as America, but rather as “the 
influence of democracy on America,” we ought to expect to find in it lessons on 
democracy that will be useful even today.28 
 
If Tocqueville’s two-volume tome truly is “at once the best book ever written on 
democracy and the best book ever written on America,”29 what does it teach us about the 
specific topic of the causal mechanisms of the democratic peace? Recall that, for Owen, 
the fundamental causal mechanism of the democratic peace amounts to the unique 
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content, or guiding principles, of liberalism. Despite a general human tendency to prefer 
those who are similar to oneself, Owen contends, we see consistently peaceful relations 
only between liberal democratic states precisely because liberalism is rooted in self-
determination and respect for the autonomy of others, and because it tends to value only 
those conceptions of the good life that conform to what he calls “the ordinary life.” 
Notwithstanding the impressive book that Owen develops from this basic thesis, he 
leaves unexplained several key theoretical connections whose ambiguity weakens the 
explanatory power of his theory. I argue that one cannot truly understand the causal 
mechanisms of the democratic peace without clarifying these theoretical obscurities. 
Thus, I will use Tocqueville’s Democracy in America to answer two broad questions. 
First, on what grounds does liberalism assume that all human beings, if uncoerced, will 
choose a life rooted in non-violence, self-determination, and respect for the independence 
of others? Moreover, how do these basic liberal principles, given the fact of anarchy, 
transcend political boundaries and affect the relations between autonomous states? 
Second, if liberalism theoretically assents to any life devoted to non-violent ends, why 
has “the ordinary life” tended to prevail in most liberal societies? 
 
As I will demonstrate below, the precise theoretical line of reasoning was left obscure 
in Owen’s theory for one key reason: he did not adequately account for and investigate 
the effects of equality, not on laws or political institutions, but on mores, i.e., “the 
ensemble of ideas from which the habits of the mind are formed.”30 It is precisely the 
examination of the effects of equality of conditions on mores that forms the subject of the 
second volume of Democracy in America. Although he acknowledges the existence and 
power of several other variables that have shaped the American social state, Tocqueville 
makes clear the precise subject of his inquiry: “I have not undertaken to show the reason 
for all our inclinations and all our ideas; I have only wanted to show to what extent 
equality had modified both” (692-3). In doing so, Tocqueville intends to reveal “how 
                                                 





democracy looks with respect to its end or aim.”31 This project must begin, he indicates 
with the topic of his first chapter, with an examination of the manner of operation of the 
American mind, or what he calls the “philosophical method” of the Americans.  
Tocqueville begins by declaring the existence of a particular philosophical method 
that is pervasive in America. Despite having no philosophical school of their own, nearly 
all the inhabitants of America, Tocqueville observed, display the same manner of 
thinking or set of presuppositions that inform and guide their thought. The single feature 
that defines this method is that, “in most operations of the mind, each American appeals 
only to the individual effort of his reason”: the Americans are Cartesian without knowing 
it.32 Yet it is the Americans’ ignorance of this fact, not the fact itself, that makes this 
method peculiarly American. This same manner of thinking exists, and is even more 
rigorously followed, in France and elsewhere in Europe. Setting aside the historical 
details that account for the differences in rigor of application across countries, how does 
equality produce this philosophical method? 
 
Having destroyed the strict limitations that confined men to a particular class and 
precluded them from seeking to change their station, equality imbues democratic society 
with the tumultuous movement of individuals constantly changing rank—ascending and 
descending the social ladder, striking it rich and losing it all—that weakens or breaks the 
generational bond that formerly united families and tied them to the same social position. 
A closely-knit family that spanned generations, beyond simply defining one’s status in 
society, provided people with particular maxims, habits, opinions, and prejudices that 
informed their thinking and instilled in them the belief that all men are not equally 
capable of judging all matters. This same volatility induced by equality of conditions, it 
almost goes without saying, prevents individuals from drawing “their beliefs from the 
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opinions of the class to which they belong, for there are so to speak no longer any 
classes” (700). 
 
Not even can the intelligence of one man, no matter how extraordinarily impressive, 
have much effect on shaking each individual from faith in their own reason. For without 
visible and permanent symbols of superiority of one man or class over another, all people 
become more or less similar and intermingle with each other at a relatively close range. 
Under such leveled conditions, insofar as people do not see in any one individual “the 
signs of incontestable greatness and superiority, they are constantly brought back to their 
own reason as the most visible and nearest source of truth” (700-1). Tocqueville’s 
discussion of this distinctively democratic method of thinking thus helps spell out more 
clearly why Owen, in his account of the unique content of liberalism, emphasized the 
principle of universal rationality that is at the core of the liberal’s conception of human 
nature. 
 
Noting that this reliance on one’s own reason is most intense at the end of democratic 
revolutions, Tocqueville concludes the chapter with a somber picture of the democratic 
philosophical method at its worst: when each person tries to rely only on his own 
enlightenment and revels in having beliefs that are his own, men are “no longer tied 
together except by interests and not by ideas, and you would say that human opinions no 
longer form anything other than a kind of intellectual dust that swirls on all sides, 
powerless to come together and settle” (708-9). Yet this depiction of a hyper-cartelized 
society does not accord with the reality of most modern democracies, nor is it consistent 
with the age-old critique of the rule of the demos. What then accounts for this difference? 
What is the most common consequence of this ubiquitous faith in universal rationality 
among men?  
 
As if anticipating these questions, Tocqueville dedicates the second chapter of the 





excessively grim picture with which he concluded the first chapter. Although equality of 
conditions engenders a society in which each individual withdraws into himself and 
professes to judge all things according only to his reason, no community of human beings 
can exist, let alone prosper, without all citizens being held together by some principal 
ideas. And some of these shared ideas, or “dogmatic beliefs,” must emanate from a single 
source, perhaps the clearest example being a common religion. No matter what the 
circumstances, Tocqueville declares, one can always find some sort of authority when it 
comes to intellectual and moral questions. Thus, the question is not to know if an 
intellectual authority exists in democratic societies, but rather to know where it is and to 
understand its character and the extent of its influence.  
 
In our own time, in which public opinion polls dominate the news and drive politics, 
the answer seems obvious. That common opinion was the “sole guide” remaining for 
“individual reason among democratic peoples” was equally evident to Tocqueville (718). 
For if all people are endowed with similar enlightenment, truth on any given subject is of 
course “found on the side of the greatest number.” That is, while it is true that the laws in 
America “are such that the majority governs society as a sovereign,” Tocqueville makes 
clear that the cause of this weighty authority of public opinion is not political institutions, 
but rather equality itself (718-23). Captivated as we are by the increasing sophistication 
and complexity of the tools used by political scientists and professional polling firms to 
gauge the opinion of the public, we are apt to lose sight of the immense power given to 
common opinion in today’s democratic society. The description provided by Tocqueville, 
who remembered when men took as their guide the superior reason of a single individual 
or class, is thus particularly clear-sighted and discerning. In his view, public opinion in 
democracies “does not persuade, it imposes its beliefs and makes them penetrate souls by 
a kind if immense pressure of the mind of all on the intelligence of each.” Even religion, 






In explicating the profound influence of public opinion in democratic centuries, 
Tocqueville brings out a consequence of equality that is critical to his conception of 
democracy. Since all men are held to be equal with respect to their rational faculties, each 
individual, when he compares himself with those around him, feels proud and 
independent; but, as soon as he envisions the entire citizenry and places himself next to 
the great public mass, he becomes overwhelmed by his relative weakness and 
insignificance. The same equality that makes a person “independent of each one of his 
fellow citizens in particular,” Tocqueville observes, at the same time “delivers him 
isolated and defenseless to the action of the greatest number” (719).  
 
Tocqueville’s account of the way in which equality engenders this tension within the 
individual living in a democratic society helps clarify Owen’s argument that the standard 
embedded in the liberal’s notion of the good life is the peculiar “sort of autonomy that 
respects others’ autonomy.”33 Independent from the authority of family and class, free to 
seek by himself and in himself alone answers to all questions, the democratic man is bold 
and proudly asserts his autonomy. This freedom, however, is always crippled by a sense 
of weakness: vulnerable without the security and guidance of family or class, 
infinitesimally small and defenseless compared to the rest of society that forms an 
unstratified mass, rejecting violence appears to him as a matter of self-interest. And in 
embracing his own independence, since it derives from the equality he shares with his 
fellow citizens, the democratic man is compelled to respect the autonomy of all others in 
his community: rejecting the equality of his neighbor would require him to question the 
very source of his own independence and pride.  
 
Having thus clarified the liberal assumption that, because of the fundamental equality 
of mind among men, all people will choose to live their life according to the principles of 
self-determination and respect for the autonomy of others, we can now turn to examine 
how these liberal principles exercise their pacifying effects amongst sovereign states 
                                                 





acting in an anarchic environment. To take this critical step in identifying the causal 
mechanisms of the democratic peace, we will seek guidance in Tocqueville’s chapter on 
individualism and his discussion of the peculiar sort of sympathy engendered by equality. 
 
For Tocqueville, there is a clear link between the unique philosophical method of 
Americans and his concept of “individualism”: just as equality leads each man to look for 
his beliefs within himself, it just as powerfully directs the individual to turn “all his 
sentiments toward himself alone.”34 Although a continuation of the withdrawal into one’s 
own affairs, this democratic trait is not yet self-centeredness. Whereas “egoism” is a kind 
of inflated love of oneself that causes individuals to be concerned with nothing other than 
themselves and their own personal good, Tocqueville observes that individualism is a 
“considered and peaceful sentiment” that leads each citizen to isolate himself from 
society and to withdraw into his family and close friends (882). Without clearly defined 
duties to the public mass comprised entirely of his equals, the individualistic man 
abandons society to itself, resigning from active participation in, or great concern for, his 
community. We need not look far to find examples of this democratic trait of 
individualism in our own day: consistently low voter turnout rates, for instance, aptly 
capture this image of the apathetic democratic citizen. Yet how exactly does equality 
cause this isolation and erosion of public spiritedness? As he often does, Tocqueville 
explains this causal relationship by comparing democratic society to that of an 
aristocracy.  
 
By ordaining and institutionalizing the inequality of man through a fixed social 
hierarchy, aristocratic conventions have the counterintuitive effect of strengthening the 
bonds between individual citizens, both within and across classes. Each class, since it 
shares common customs, habits, opinions, beliefs, and experiences, forms for each 
individual who is a part of it “a kind of small country, more visible and dearer than the 
large one.” Moreover, these conventional restrictions that kept all people in fixed 
                                                 





positions at the same time enshrined and made very visible a variety of mutual 
obligations between classes: “each citizen always sees above him a man whose protection 
he needs, and below he finds another whose help he can claim” (883). All the classes of 
society were thus tied together, from the peasant all the way up to the king, like a chain, 
each group forming its own distinctive link upon whose existence the entire chain 
depended. When the doctrine of the equality of man washed away these conventional 
bonds, the classes intermingled and moved closer to one another, causing its members, 
isolated and weak amid the great mass of society, to “become indifferent and like 
strangers to each other” (884). 
 
Yet the individualistic democrat is not, Tocqueville adds in an interesting turn in his 
account, completely bereft of any interest in, or sense of kinship toward, other human 
beings. Neither is he, as we have learned, egoistic or entirely self-centered. Indeed, the 
same sense of obligation or duty to one’s fellow man is present in democratic centuries, 
but the object changes. Equality among human beings, Tocqueville says, makes “the 
duties of each individual toward the species […] much clearer; devotion toward one man 
(or one class) becomes more rare; the bond of human affections expands and relaxes” 
(884). Thus, implicit in Tocqueville’s account of “individualism” is a particular 
conception of human nature that presupposes that human beings are by nature, if not 
political animals, at least social animals. No matter how great the tendency for the 
democratic man to be interested only in those closest to him, Tocqueville notes that his 
sociability is not enclosed entirely within himself; unlike those driven by “egoism”—a 
vice as old as the world—he is not animated exclusively by an exaggerated love of 
himself. The individualistic, democratic man still has a sense of duty to, and a desire to 
cultivate affections with, other human beings. What is distinctively democratic, however, 
is the change in the object of those affections and sense of duty. Tocqueville explains this 
shift in his treatment of the peculiar form of sympathy inspired by equality, perhaps the 
quintessential democratic sentiment in his examination of how mores become milder as 





core of the third part of the second volume of Democracy in America, will finally clarify 
how the pacific liberal principles can eclipse the power of anarchy and international 
border to induce peaceful relations between democratic states. 
 
Tocqueville opens his discussion of the “Influence of Democracy on Mores Properly 
So Called” by asserting that “equality of conditions and mores becoming mild”—two 
trends that have been developing for “several centuries”—are “not only contemporaneous 
events, but also correlative facts” (988). The former causes the latter directly and 
indirectly. He explains the direct effects of equality on mores as follows: leveling the 
ranks of society and thereby engendering a common way of thinking and feeling among 
the people, equality enables each individual to form in his mind a clear picture of the 
experiences of all his fellow citizens, their joys and especially their sufferings. With little 
creative effort he can visualize the miseries of those around him: everyone being equals, 
he easily imagines himself in their position and thereby understands what it must be like 
to undergo such an episode. This imaginative process, occurring immediately and 
unwittingly, “mingles something personal in his pity, and makes him suffer as the body 
of his fellow man is torn apart” (993). Here Tocqueville again brings to the fore the 
weakness and isolation felt by the democratic individual. Just as it is in the democrat’s 
interest to reject violence and coercion, his pity becomes personal when witnessing or 
hearing about someone’s suffering; he can so easily imagine himself going through the 
same hardship in the future that part of him believes it to be in his interest to sympathize 
with, if not lend aid to, his fellow citizen. Equality of conditions “makes men feel their 
independence,” but at the same time it exposes them to “a thousand accidents, and 
experience does not take long to teach them that, although they do not habitually need the 
help of others, some moment almost always occurs when they cannot do without that 
help” (1006). 
 
To be sure, Tocqueville does not believe that sympathy thus conceived is a 





that each aristocratic class is like its own small, separate country, he explains that the 
members of each class “experience for each other a continual and active sympathy that 
can never be found to the same degree among the citizens of a democracy” (989-90). For 
when all individuals are arranged immutably according to their occupation, property, and 
birth, the members of each class see themselves like the progeny of the same family, all 
habituated through similar experiences and to common mores. These conventional 
boundaries facilitate the strengthening of the natural bonds between men: although “the 
general notion of fellow is obscure,” and consequently one rarely thinks to lay down his 
life for “the cause of humanity,” it is more common to sacrifice oneself for “certain men” 
(883). What is uniquely democratic, by contrast, is that those for whom an individual is 
inclined to feel sympathy expands from certain men, or a particular class, to all of 
society.  
 
Yet if Tocqueville said in his discussion of individualism that equality of conditions 
leads man to see more clearly his sense of duty to the entire human race, why is the 
uniquely democratic sympathy confined within the boundaries of a particular political 
community? The answer is that the softening effect of equality on mores cannot 
completely uproot the natural human tendency to prefer those who are similar to oneself. 
Put differently, the mild mores engendered by equality must coexist with the fact of 
“favoritism,” or as Owen put it, the general tendency for human beings “to favor their 
own type, be that type racial, ethnic, religious, or something else.”35 The individualistic 
democrat does not, according to Tocqueville, feel genuine sympathy for every other 
human being on earth. And this, Tocqueville explains, is perfectly understandable. For 
“there are real sympathies only between similar people,” and the most influential 
similarity between two people is derived not from the theoretical equality of mankind, but 
rather from the sharing of common opinions, sentiments, rights, and mores.36 People who 
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share in these things, Tocqueville proclaims, constitute a “separate existence.”37 Thus, the 
sharing of “real sympathies” between all people in a society was unknown in aristocratic 
centuries, for the members in each class are not similar to those in any of the others: 
“they do not have the same way of thinking or of feeling, and they scarcely believe that 
they are part of the same humanity” (990).  
 
By contrast, in a society defined by the equality of conditions, all individuals, 
precisely because they share similar sentiments and a common way of thinking, are 
capable of feeling sympathy for one another. Yet at the same time those particular 
opinions, sentiments, rights and mores constitute the boundary of the society’s 
sympathies. That is, for the democratic man there are certain opinions, habits, or ideas 
that would exclude an individual or group of people from his feelings of sympathy; and 
he (or the society of which he is a member) gets to delineate, however imprecisely, the 
principles that constitute that boundary. In the time when Tocqueville journeyed through 
America, the slaveholder most conspicuously exemplified this phenomenon of 
democratic sympathy. In the same man Tocqueville saw two distinct characters: one 
“who is full of humanity for his fellows when the latter are at the same time his equals,” 
and the other who “becomes insensitive to their sufferings from the moment when 
equality ceases” (994). The duality of the slave master thus elucidates that the 
fundamental source of his mildness is not his education or his level of civilization, but 
rather the equality that permeates and guides his society.  
 
Notwithstanding the singularly restricted view of the slaveholder—a figure 
Tocqueville saw as a kind of aristocratic relic what appeared incongruous with the 
majority of American society—it is this same equality that suggests to the imagination of 
the democratic citizen a fundamental equality between himself and all other human 
beings on earth. The leveling of ranks within a political society animates an inherent 
human awareness, dimmed under aristocratic institutions, of a basic similarity shared by 
                                                 





all human beings. The experience of being able to “judge in a moment the sensations of 
all” one’s fellow citizens, the unintentional mixing of one’s own feelings with one’s pity 
for others, provokes the individual’s attachment to equality to transcend his own political 
community (993). And as Tocqueville indicated earlier, this sympathy must be 
understood as decisively mild, because as one’s sentiments and affections expand, it is 
inevitable that they will also relax. In a moment of reflection on the influence this new 
era of equality exercises on his own life, Tocqueville finds that his generation is not 
necessarily more sensitive than that of his aristocratic forbearers, but that “certainly our 
sensibility falls on more things” (ibid.). Attesting to the power that equality of conditions 
exercises over the imagination of human beings, Tocqueville notes how even the sources 
of poetry change in democratic centuries: 
 
…it is not only the members of the same nation who become similar; nations 
themselves assimilate, and all together form in the eye of the beholder nothing more 
than a vast democracy in which each citizen is a people. That brings to light for the 
first time the figure of the human species (837-8). 
 
What Tocqueville here casts as the creative musings of the democratic poet, he later 
indicates could prove to be a realistic vision of the future. So powerful is the softening 
influence of democracy that nothing, not even the relations between foreign countries, 
will be exempt from its force: as “peoples become more similar to each other,” 
Tocqueville affirms, “the law of nations becomes milder” (994). This brief and enigmatic 
statement, his last word in the chapter on the effect of equality on mores, is the closest 
Tocqueville comes in Democracy to conceiving of a Kantian-like perpetual peace. It 
aptly concludes his chapter on the way in which equality causes mores to become milder, 
for his account of how the unique features of democratic sympathy elucidate the liberal 
principles of self-determination and respect for others’ autonomy exert their pacifying 
influence amongst sovereign states acting in an anarchic environment. Whereas Owen’s 
causal mechanism depended on the imprecise notion of “ideological prisms,”38 
                                                 





Tocqueville reveals that the distinctive mildness, and its attendant sympathy, provoked by 
equality of conditions, insofar as it draws man’s sight beyond his own country and 
illuminates the human race in a way never experienced before in history, must be 
understood as the key means by which the pacific liberal principles expand from the 
domestic polity to the international system. As we will see below, Tocqueville was 
perfectly aware of the anarchic character of the international system, but he nevertheless 
envisioned that the softening influence of equality had the capacity to overcome anarchy 
and thereby determine and define the relations between democratic states. 
 
Recall that at the outset of his discussion of the effects of equality of conditions on 
mores Tocqueville stated that equality acted on the American ideas and opinions in both 
direct and indirect ways. If the preceding arguments, derived only from the direct effects, 
help clarify the assumption inherent in liberalism that “free choice will yield not chaos or 
self-destruction but peace,”39 and demonstrate how the liberal principle of uncoerced self-
determination exerts its pacifying effects in the international realm, how do the indirect 
effects of equality on mores help us understand the causal mechanisms of the democratic 
peace?  
 
Tocqueville devotes little attention to the indirect effects, perhaps because the 
argument is relatively straightforward: By opening to all people the possibility of 
advancing one’s position in society, and by destroying all symbols of distinction besides 
wealth and property, equality of conditions “leads men toward industrial and commercial 
professions, which need peace in order for men to devote themselves to those 
professions.”40 This meaning of mildness is a self-conscious and self-interested desire for 
peace and opposition to war that results from individuals responding to a change in the 
incentive structure of society. However, if we look elsewhere in Democracy we quickly 
discover that the implications of this democratic penchant for industrial and commercial 
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professions and the attendant desire for material wellbeing are critically important for 
Tocqueville’s understanding of democracy. The picture that he sketches of this indirect 
effect of equality of conditions closely resembles what Owen calls “the ordinary life” and 
can therefore help explain why, according to Owen, the liberal predilection to value as 
“intrinsically worthy” “labor, household management, and even commerce” contributes 
to liberalism’s pacifying effect on international relations.41  
 
According to Tocqueville, the ardent and insatiable love of material wellbeing is at 
once the most striking and the most comprehensible feature of American society. This 
“concern to satisfy the slightest needs of the body and to provide for the smallest 
conveniences of life” is the “national and dominant taste”; equality of conditions destined 
it to be the direction toward which the “great current of human passions leads,” sweeping 
“everything along in its wake.”42 As Tocqueville makes clear, once equality of conditions 
is introduced in a society, the people cannot turn out any other way. This necessary 
causal relationship rests on the notion that the taste for material wellbeing is an inherent 
human passion: equality did not introduce, but rather only modified, the desire for wealth 
and material comforts—a desire that emanates from the soul. Indeed, this is one of the 
key attributes that sets us apart from the beasts: “What makes us superior in this to 
animals is that we use our soul to find the material goods toward which their instinct 
alone leads them.”43 
 
In aristocratic societies, neither the rich nor the poor were concerned with material 
goods. By guaranteeing that the rich man’s material desires will be satisfied without 
difficulty or fear, the conventional class hierarchy allows his soul to proceed elsewhere 
and [attach] itself to some more difficult and greater enterprise that animates it and 
carries it away.” Similarly, the lower classes despair of acquiring great quantities of 
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material goods: having learned from generations of experience that his position in society 
is fixed, “the imagination of the poor [man] is pushed toward the other world,” escaping 
the miseries of life it “goes to find its enjoyments beyond” (932-3). These transcendent 
ends toward which both the rich and the poor man’s soul and imagination aspire are 
precisely the goals that Owen explains are de facto precluded by those of “the ordinary 
life.” That is, when material wellbeing is prevented from being the goal of life, 
individuals are freed to devote their lives to religious contemplation or self-sacrifice, 
societies value heroism or spirituality, lives are aimed at the immaterial, be it military 
glory or worship of the divine. Common to all of these notions of ends is their 
compatibility with, or inclination toward, what Tocqueville calls “warrior passions.” 
Under equality of conditions, on the other hand, lives directed toward these goals and the 
warrior passions themselves will become more rare and less intense: 
 
The ever-increasing number of property owners friendly to peace, the 
development of personal wealth, which war so rapidly devours, this leniency of 
morals, this softness of heart, this predisposition toward pity that equality inspires, 
this coldness of reason that makes men hardly sensitive to the poetic and violent 
emotions which arise among arms, all these causes join together to extinguish 
military spirit (1154). 
 
By abolishing the conventional constraints imposed on human beings, equality of 
conditions releases and nourishes the natural human desire for wealth and material 
comforts. For without any privileges of birth or wealth, all professions are theoretically 
open to everyone, the summit of each appearing within reach by means of one’s own 
unaided, individual efforts. Freed from any formal, immovable limit on one’s future, each 
person easily imagines “that they are called to great destinies” (945). Yet just as equality 
of conditions renders each citizen independent and weak at the same instant, so too does 
it cripple this grand ambition by exposing each person to the competition of all, 
ultimately leaving them individually powerless. “When men are more or less similar and 
follow the same road,” Tocqueville notes, “it is very difficult for any one of them to 





In spite of his impotence, the democratic man is unable to renounce the pursuit of wealth; 
he cannot avoid participating in the ubiquitous competition with all of society. For 
strength can be acquired only through material success, and his taste for wellbeing grows 
ever stronger “as it is being satisfied” (460). Of course, because everyone is compelled to 
play at the same game, it is a mathematical certainty that the majority of fortunes, and 
therefore of ambitions, will end in mediocrity. The average democrat’s desire for material 
wellbeing consists not in the achievement of any “great destinies,” but in “small goals”: 
he seeks not to build “vast palaces” or vanquish nature, but rather to add “a few feet to 
his fields,” plant an orchard, enlarge his house, make life “easier and more comfortable 
each moment,” avoid discomfort and satisfy the “slightest needs effortlessly and almost 
without cost” (937). 
 
The result of this unique combination of equality of opportunity and weakness is 
summed up in Tocqueville’s chapter, “Why Americans Appear So Restless Amid Their 
Well-Being.” With money as his only fixed point, the democratic man comes to believe 
that he will find complete happiness in material goods. He is continually spurred on by 
both the fear of losing his fortune and the availability of acquiring all those goods that he 
does not already possess. This perpetual pursuit of material wellbeing, though it 
“torments and fatigues the soul,” makes war and the “warrior passions” appear as mere 
distractions that ought to be avoided so long as the implications of peace do not threaten a 
society’s acquisitive capacity (946).  
 
Tocqueville’s depiction of the democratic individual who is tirelessly and 
exclusively devoted to “small goals” clarifies what Owen means by “the ordinary life” 
and demonstrates why the tendency to favor this kind of life contributes to liberalism’s 
pacifying effect on the relations between democratic states. Taken on its own, this 
account of “the ordinary life” might be perceived as an “monadic theory” of the 
democratic peace, i.e., an explanation that starts from the premise that democratic states 





observation that “true sympathies” exist only between people with shared mores, it 
becomes clear that the ordinary life cannot, on its own, cause democracies to be more 














Section 2: Tocqueville and Modern Liberal Foreign Policy 
 
Having thus concluded my Tocquevillean analysis of the democratic peace and its 
most fundamental causal mechanisms, a question arises: if Tocqueville understood 
democracies to be trending toward pacific international relations, at least with each other, 
would he have been in favor of such an outcome? How would he have viewed a “milder” 
law of nations, or a “vast democracy” into which all democratic states assimilated?44 
Tocqueville never provides an explicit answer to these questions. The little attention he 
devotes to foreign affairs in Democracy is focused on particularities of American foreign 
policy or the effects of equality on democratic militaries. Nor is an explicit answer given 
in his later writings on empire and slavery: composed as candidate for, and later as a 
member of, the Chamber of Deputies for the purpose of evaluating specific French 
policies and programs, they contain little theorizing about international relations. 
Nevertheless, insofar as these essays and letters constitute key accomplishments of his 
career as an elected official, it stands to reason that collectively they can illustrate, even if 
only as a kind of blueprint, his conception of foreign affairs and of the ideal conduct and 
goals of a statesman. In order to discern more clearly whatever we can discover in these 
writings of Tocqueville’s judgment of a future “milder” law of nations, in what follows 
below I will compare his diplomatic record to that of a statesman who made explicit his 
opinion on the pacifying effects of democracy: Woodrow Wilson. That is, Wilson’s 
foreign policy ideology—which, rooted in Kantian internationalism, sought explicitly to 
bring about a “perpetual peace” among nations—will serve as an archetype in light of 
which I will examine Tocqueville’s writings on empire and slavery.  
 
As I will demonstrate below, the key differences between Tocqueville and 
Wilson’s conceptions of the ideal statesman are at bottom rooted in divergent conceptions 
of morality. That is, the foreign policy of each man proceeded from his particular 
                                                 





understanding of equality, liberty, and the duties and obligations—of individuals and of 
governments—that arise from each. Wilson’s foreign policy ideology was defined and 
directed above all by his conviction that all human beings are not only fundamentally 
equal in their capacity for self-determination, but also universally united in that they all 
share the ardent desire for, and interest in, peace as their highest goal. Since Wilson “did 
not conceive of a unification of men achieved at the expense of their variety or 
autonomy,” he understood this view of humanity to entail a moral duty of the statesman 
to attempt to implement peace among nations; in Wilson’s mind, such universal peace 
required first and foremost that all sovereign states no longer regard their national interest 
as something distinct from, and potentially opposed to, the interest and benefit of 
mankind.45  
 
By contrast, Tocqueville conceived of the equality of human beings in more 
limited terms: while all men universally share in the right to self-government, he 
maintained that “the autonomous strivings and self-directed development of various 
groups of men” will inevitably produce “conflicting aspirations, postures, and 
demands.”46 That is, Tocqueville did not consider all human beings, let alone all 
independent nations, to view peace as the most urgent and necessary goal. This was a 
truth for Tocqueville not simply in theory: speaking for himself, he writes in a letter to 
John Stuart Mill in March 1841 that the most “dangerous” political arguments in France 
are those posited not by the “partisans of war,” but rather by the “party [that] would 
sacrifice everything for peace.” For such policies would, in Tocqueville’s view, simply 
aggravate “the greatest malady” threatening France: namely, “the gradual softening of 
mores, the abasement of the mind, [and] the mediocrity of tastes” that collectively make 
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up “the natural vices” of democracy.47 Tocqueville understood his diplomatic career 
above all as an opportunity to assist in forestalling the further development of this 
democratic pathology in France.  
 
Connecting Immanuel Kant to Woodrow Wilson 
 
The foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson is the linchpin that connects Kant’s 
philosophy and what I have called the second “legacy” of Kant, i.e., modern liberal 
foreign policy. In reviving the key principles of Kant’s international idealist philosophy, 
Wilson’s foreign policy has served as the predominant precedent for the practice of 
foreign policy by most Western democratic states since World War I. But the tenets of 
Wilsonianism form only one of two parts that together constitute “liberal 
internationalism,” or the guiding ideology of modern liberal foreign policy. Liberal 
internationalism is best understood as a compact, originating in the United States, that 
blends two traditions in American foreign policy—power and cooperation. It  first 
emerged successfully as a unified whole under the leadership of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt. However, it is the cooperative element that is of particular interest here. For 
the tradition of power in foreign relations, typified by Theodore Roosevelt, is not 
distinctively American. The commitment to exercise one’s national power and strength 
through “multilateral partnership rather than unilateral initiative,” on the other hand, is 
unmistakably American and it can be traced directly to Woodrow Wilson.48 Moreover, 
this cooperative component of liberal internationalism epitomized by Wilson’s unique 
merging of power and cooperation has, according to most scholars, remained “the 
bedrock” of American foreign policy since the end of World War I.49 If “Wilsonianism” 
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has had the most direct and significant effect on American, if not all Western liberal, 
foreign policy in the twentieth century, the most profound influence on Wilson himself 
and on his foreign policies was the thought of Immanuel Kant. 
 
It is not my purpose to conduct a comprehensive analysis of Wilson’s foreign 
policy.50 Nor do I offer an original examination of Kant. Rather, I will limit my treatment 
of the ties between the two men to explicating the following statement made by Pangle 
and Ahrensdorf (1999), and in doing so I will rely primarily on their reading of Kant’s 
philosophical works: Woodrow Wilson, in “setting the aspirations if not the goals of 
American foreign policy in the twentieth century,” can be said “to have been formed 
more by Kant than by any other master.”51 To the Wilsonian scholar, this asseveration 
must be particularly striking: despite being a scholar and professor of government long 
before becoming a politician and the president of the United States, there is little, if any, 
evidence that Wilson ever read or thought about Kant. How then are we to understand the 
proposition that Wilson was formed and molded by a philosopher virtually unknown to 
him? What is the content and character of the lessons that Wilson unwittingly absorbed 
from Kant?  
 
The Kantian philosophic project is best understood as an effort to reestablish “ethics 
as the central human concern.”52 Kant was driven above all by his unyielding resolve to 
set morality in a firm theoretical foundation, a transformative project intended to 
overcome the key defect at the heart of all previous philosophic accounts of morality. 
Guided by the thought of Rousseau, Kant saw all earlier moral thinkers to have 
erroneously conceived of virtue, not as an end in itself, but in terms of its contribution to 
the higher goal of happiness. This subordination of morality not only debases virtue, but 
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it also implies an inaccurate view of moral action. For in our “concrete experience of the 
moral in ourselves and in others,” Kant contends, what we ultimately admire is good will 
exercised “strictly for its own sake.” It is the “uncontingent and unconditioned” will that 
freely chooses to obey the obligations and duties of morality, understood as unqualified 
ends in themselves, that constitutes the essence of moral action.53  
 
In illuminating and explicating the groundwork of the moral experience that had 
heretofore remained implicit, Kant argues that all moral principles must meet two 
standards: they must be understood as thoroughly distinct from all other guidelines that 
are followed merely as means to some greater good, and they must be equally binding on 
all human beings. These two standards are enshrined in Kant’s notion of the “categorical 
imperative,” i.e., the one and only standard by which a principle is judged to be truly a 
moral principle. Pangle and Ahrensdorf (1999) aptly summarize Kant’s categorical 
imperative by constructing a hypothetical test to which one would have to submit every 
moral decision he makes: 
 
Do I will the maxim of my action not only as a means to my own and others’ 
happiness, but also, and more important to me as a moral person, can I will it as a 
universal law—that is, can I conceive it as valid permanently, and not only for me 
and those I feel attached to, with our particular characteristics and wants, and in my 
present unique circumstances, but as something valid universally, to be willed by 
every rational agent confronted with roughly similar options?54  
 
Implicit in Kant’s account of the primary features of morality, of what all human 
beings understand to be entailed in moral duty, are particular notions of equality and of 
liberty. Equality of human beings is universal, and is defined most fundamentally by 
equal potential and longings for righteous action. To be a human being means to share in 
a common capacity for moral action; and all human beings, when acting morally, believe 
to be doing what is equally required of and willed by all other human beings faced with 
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similar circumstances. Human freedom is the exercise of one’s moral will. True 
autonomy is achieved only when one acts morally: the man who does what is right, in 
accordance with the test of universality, transcends all other motives or principles of 
action that serve personal, non-universal ends, and thereby obeys only the law he has 
given himself—a law that he shares equally with all mankind.  
 
For Kant, this inner freedom, or self-legislation according to universal principles, is 
the defining feature of human dignity. So inviolable is this individual liberty that it is, in 
his view, superior to the authority of the state. Since the moral will, if it is to emanate 
strictly from one’s sovereign choice, requires that all individuals be free from coercion or 
persuasion to act morally, the proper role of government cannot include any kind of 
moral education. Rather, the function of the ideal Kantian state is limited to securing the 
external freedom for its citizens, i.e., eliminating any obstacles to the individual’s pursuit 
of happiness and ability to discover, through the influence of public opinion, the self-
directed moral will. Equally limited, according to Kant, are the demands of justice. 
Whereas the universalized moral law entails just action, “justice cannot demand of men 
that they be moral, or even that they be just in the sense of acting for the sake of justice, 
or out of respect for others’ freedom.”55 Therefore, a state can maintain perfect freedom 
among its citizens even if no two individuals are moved by a genuine concern for, or 
interest in, each other’s freedom, so long as each man “act externally in such a way that 
the free use of [his] will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a 
universal law.”56  
 
While the categorical imperative’s demand of a strictly self-originating moral will 
limits the government from forcing its citizens to act morally, it imposes no such 
restriction on the state’s interactions with other sovereign states. Suddenly, the statesman 
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qua statesman, in his conduct of foreign policy, is bound by the concern with the freedom 
and dignity of all human beings that was previously an implied moral duty only of 
individuals. Yet, to remain logically consistent, Kant contends that the grounds of the 
state’s concern are not identical to those of the individual. States are the product of a 
conventional contract, and therefore are not, strictly speaking, moral entities like 
individuals. Thus, states are not morally obligated to exercise their coercive power for 
moral ends in foreign affairs, however, the insuperable anarchy that reigns supreme over 
the relations of autonomous states compels governments to follow whatever course 
maximizes the external freedom and security of all actors. The extreme harshness that 
prevails in the Kantian state of nature among nations is the crux of his conception of 
international relations. Without a formal compact, there is nothing that constrains an 
individual from infringing on the rights or property of anyone else: 
 
Therefore, he need not wait until he finds out through bitter experience about the 
hostile attitude of the other man. There is nothing binding him to wait to become 
prudent until after he has suffered a loss. Because he can quite adequately observe 
within himself the inclination of mankind in general to play the master over others 
(that is, man’s inclination not to respect the rights of others when he feels superior to 
them in might or cleverness), it is unnecessary to wait for actual hostilities. A man is 
authorized to use his coercion against anyone who by his very nature threatens him.57 
 
When one considers the great degree to which participation in, and even preparation 
for, armed conflict defy and oppose the sacred freedom of each state’s citizens, “the 
greatest and most pressing of all moral tasks of politics,” according to Kant, becomes 
clear: “The effort to discover means of moving toward and eventually bringing about 
‘perpetual peace’ in a global ‘kingdom of ends’ that would reflect, if it does not 
instantiate, the universality of the moral law.”58 While Kant’s conception of the 
exemplary activity of the statesman certainly evokes Woodrow Wilson’s post-World War 
I vision for a new world order, embodied in his “Fourteen Points” and effort to establish a 
                                                 
57 Kant, “The Metaphysical Elements of Justice,” trans. Ladd, 71-2.  





League of Nations, in what follows below I will demonstrate that Wilson’s 
personification of Kantian statesmanship is due less to particular policy positions than to 
his view of equality and liberty. 
 
Following what was revealed in Kant’s account of the psychological groundwork of 
morality, Woodrow Wilson understands equality and liberty to be inextricably linked and 
mutually reinforcing. Although he does not speak of the “moral will” or offer any 
philosophic analysis of morality, Wilson conceives of equality as universal in that all 
human beings share the same interests and values of peace, freedom, and justice. 
Freedom is the exercise of one’s uncoerced will, the actualization of the universal 
capacity for self-determination; and, because all human beings uniformly conceive their 
greatest need and highest interest to be peace and universal harmony with their neighbor 
as much as with a foreign people, no individual’s power of self-determination is ever 
truly in tension with what unites him with all of mankind, i.e., his desire for and interest 
in concord and goodwill. In other words, Wilson conceived of a unity of mankind that did 
not threaten, but rather is completely compatible with, the natural variety and autonomy 
of the human race. 
 
Here Wilson goes beyond even Kant’s faith in the human moral will. No longer is the 
universally shared law of morality something that must be discovered or encouraged by 
society, as it was for Kant; rather, it is the inherent predilection of human beings to 
follow the common rule of mankind, that is, to act always on “that maxim as you can will 
to become a general law.”59 Moral action thus appears less admirable than Kant presented 
it; the pursuit of virtue no longer entails any great sacrifice. For if it is the natural human 
condition to strive toward moral action, happiness must be compatible with, if it does not 
consist in, morality. Moreover, if human beings are inherently predisposed to favor moral 
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deeds, the inner freedom of self-legislation that Kant held sacred loses some of its 
splendor; human freedom, understood as the exercise of one’s autonomous will in 
accordance with universalized principles, becomes less radical. It follows that Wilson 
would not share Kant’s hostility toward the expansive use of a government’s coercive 
power to elevate society’s moral awareness or to force moral action. Yet if “the basic 
interests as well as the basic values of individuals and peoples are in ultimate harmony,” 
this “coercive” or positive power of the state need not exceed the removal of whatever 
obstacles impede the full and ineluctable expression of a people’s powers of self-
determination.60 
 
While the preceding analysis makes clear that the ideology of Wilson departs from 
the teachings of Kant in critical respects, this fact should not be surprising, nor should it 
weaken the link between Kant, the philosopher, and Wilson, the statesman. For Wilson’s 
notions of the natural human condition, Clor notes, are best understood as “first 
principles”: “He did not subject them to any systematic questioning or philosophic 
inquiry.” Put differently, he believed in them in the context of making political decisions, 
not contemplating the human psychological experience of morality. Despite the absence 
of theoretical engagement on these principles, Wilson’s foreign policy clearly evinces the 
distinctive “moral sentiment” at the core of liberal democracy that finds, Pierre Hassner 
argues, its “theoretical support” from Kant more than any other modern philosopher.61  
 
If we can trace the roots of this liberal democratic “moral sentiment” back to Kant, 
Wilson is the figure responsible for its complete flourishing. His conception of human 
nature, his “first principles,” formed the lens through which he viewed the world and his 
duties as a statesman. He did not believe human or political conflicts to be “natural or 
inevitable,” but rather “the result of wrongs and injustices that temporarily obscure our 
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underlying agreement.”62 There is no barbaric state of nature, in Wilson’s mind; states, 
like individuals, are moral beings. The truth of this position becomes self-evident, Wilson 
maintains, when one casts one’s sight beyond any national boundaries and gazes upon 
“the emerging common will and concerted judgment of an aroused mankind demanding 
the subordination of self-centered nationalism.”63 From this perspective, Wilson appears 
simply as a spokesman for this unanimous world opinion. He shares equally with all the 
citizens of the world the concern with the freedom and dignity of mankind, but his 
position of power provides him an exceptionally meaningful and effective vehicle 
through which he can give expression to, as well as act on, these cosmopolitan concerns. 
For in unfettering the previously restricted positive power of the Kantian state, Wilson 
significantly broadens the scope and duties of justice. Whereas the Kant’s vision of the 
liberal state confined justice to “the principles by which men, as citizens, use the coercive 
apparatus of the state to secure their freedom from external threat and oppression,”64 
Wilson conceives of a comprehensive justice consisting in the universal maxims that 
govern and organize all human enterprise, including of course foreign affairs. The 
primary obligation of justice is to recognize and respect “the equality of all nations in 
their rights,” in particular the right of self-determination, and in their “moral claims.”65  
 
The permanent establishment of this Wilsonian justice is the remedy for all 
international conflict. While his “Fourteen Points” and plan for a League of Nations lay 
out the specific provisions through which a community of states would implement and 
sustain this basic, but universal, respect among nations, he summarized the essence of his 
vision as follows: “What we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of the 
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governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.”66 At the same time that 
the president acknowledged such an undertaking would “involve and require a radical 
transformation of world politics,” as we have already seen, he regarded the necessary 
uprooting of the international system to be a restoration of the natural human condition.67 
The Wilsonian project promises that it will finally and comprehensively eradicate the 
unnatural inequities that have veiled the fundamental agreement among the entire human 
race. Wilson saw no contradiction or tension between these two premises—that universal 
justice requires a thorough upending of the international system and that such a process 
would in fact bring human beings back to their natural situation—because he understood 
the transformation itself to be a part of the inevitable course of history. The true and 
impartial reign of justice was not, for Wilson, “a mere alternative that statesmen are free 
to choose or reject,” but rather “a conclusion imposed upon us by stubborn political 
realities and historical events—a mandate of History.” Again, Wilson’s proof of the 
authenticity and authority of this decree was the alleged “emerging world opinion” 
inevitably aroused by “the grievances and pointless sufferings” of war, which has steadily 
become “more conscious, coherent, and demanding.”68  
 
This transnational public opinion was, in Wilson’s mind, a tangible reality. As the 
leader of the only country in the world that was, as he put it, “founded for the benefit of 
humanity,” Wilson believed it his duty to institute whatever mechanisms necessary to 
ensure that the relations of independent nations reflect the equally shared interests of 
mankind.69 This project rested on his doctrine that “it is a very perilous thing to determine 
the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest.”70 Indeed, peace among 
nations required above all that each state renounce all particular interests that benefit only 
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the people within its borders, and instead conceive of its “national” interest as 
contributing to and improving the common good of all mankind. This notion of 
assimilating the formerly parochial interests of all autonomous states into one 
cosmopolitan interest of the human race, presided over and governed by the impartial 
judge of universal justice, was Wilson’s key contribution to modern liberal foreign 
policy. As Pangle and Ahrensdorf (1999) observe, since Wilson it has become “evermore 
difficult for ‘progressive’ statesmen to defend their policies in terms of simple patriotism 
or national interest, let alone empire building.” Instead, it is now common, if not 
expected, that diplomats and national leaders justify all their actions—from economic 
expansion to military interventions or security alliances—in terms of a “contribution to 
some ultimately pacific evolutionary or revolutionary world transformation that will in 
the long run lessen the spiritual as well as the political differences among peoples and 
diminish the sovereign power of states.”71  
 
With this Wilsonian legacy in mind, I will now turn to examine the diplomatic record 
and writings of Alexis de Tocqueville. While it is beyond the scope of the present study 
to conclude definitively that Tocqueville would have unconditionally disapproved of a 
“milder” law of nations, like the one envisioned and sought by Wilson, what we can say 
with certainty is that Tocqueville did not believe the interests of France to be always in 
accord with any other autonomous nation, let alone a trans-political, trans-historical 
common good of mankind. What animated Tocqueville’s diplomatic career and foreign 
policy writings above all was his desire to combat the mildness developing in French 
society. Thus, in order to understand his career after Democracy in America, one must 





                                                 





Tocqueville’s View of Democratic Mildness 
 
Perhaps Tocqueville’s most incisive assessments of the softening effects of 
equality of conditions are found in his discussions, at the end of the second volume, of 
the development of democracy in generations to come. Just as he continually looked back 
to the aristocratic past in order to understand the democratic present, so too did he peer 
into the future, trying to discern the ways in which the supremacy of equality would 
spread and continue to exert its influence on all mankind. Certain though he was that the 
“irresistible revolution” would continue “advancing amid the ruins that it has made,” he 
avoided making precise predictions about the fate of democracy.72 In the closing chapter 
of Democracy, however, he outlines a few principal features that will define the future 
character of democratic society as such. What unites these features, and what is most 
troubling for Tocqueville, is their mildness: “Nearly all the extremes become softer and 
are blunted; nearly all the salient points are worn away to make way for something 
middling, which is at the very same time less high and less low, less brilliant and less 
obscure than what was seen in the world.”73 To be sure, Tocqueville does not 
unconditionally lament this middling—how could there be nothing to praise of a 
providential fact? For instance, while equality may be less elevated, he makes clear that 
“it is more just, and its justice makes its grandeur and its beauty” (1282). What then is the 
exact content of Tocqueville’s criticism of democratic mildness? If it truly is more just, 
what precisely is there to fear about the universal middling that inevitably accompanies 
equality of conditions?  
 
Tocqueville’s greatest concern for the future development of democracy is that 
this kind of mildness will prepare a society to submit to, if not regard as a benefit, what 
he calls “democratic despotism.” That is, an “immense and tutelary” central government 
that, by attending to all of society’s needs and administering all common affairs, ends by 
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reducing the people “to being nothing more than a flock of timid and industrious animals, 
of which the government is the shepherd” (1250-2). In volume one of Democracy 
Tocqueville explains that a society can hasten the arrival of this extreme form of 
custodial government by centralizing the power to administer the laws in the hands of the 
state. Although Tocqueville discusses administrative centralization separately from mild 
mores, by the end of Democracy he regards the two as complementary means of reaching 
the same bleak end.  
 
How then do mild mores prepare individuals to submit to democratic despotism? The 
answer is that, if left unchecked, each of the separate elements that together lead to and 
constitute Tocqueville’s conception of mildness—excessive faith in the authority of 
public opinion, individualism, the insatiable desire for material wellbeing—tend to drive 
each individual to lose interest in anything but his own affairs. Withdrawn into his own 
private life, he loses the taste for participating in, and eventually becomes indifferent to, 
public matters. This is not to say that the democratic man has no interest in the fate of 
common affairs—indeed, it is of great concern to him that a certain order is maintained 
so to guarantee his peaceful pursuit of his own wellbeing. But he is naturally inclined, by 
both his apathy and the demands of private life, “to abandon the care of these affairs to 
the sole visible and permanent representative of collective interests, which is the State” 
(1201).  
 
Magnifying this democratic disposition is the fact that the principle of equality, not 
simply the material reality of equal conditions, leads men to favor the concentration of 
authority in one single and centralized power. For if the central body represents and 
derives its authority from the mass of equal citizens, it alone is perceived to be the proper 
agent to hold the greatest amount of power. By contrast, any secondary powers—e.g., 
those that prevailed in aristocratic societies, e.g., wealthy families or influential 
individuals—would represent an unfair privilege, an affront to the very notion of 





subject to the same uniform laws and habituation. As a consequence, “individuals appear 
smaller and society seems larger”: no one doubts that “the power that represents the 
society possesses much more enlightenment and wisdom than any one of the men who 
compose it, and that its duty, as well as its right, is to take each citizen by the hand and to 
lead him” (1196). 
 
In following these twin inclinations of his sentiments and his ideas, the democratic 
man becomes concerned only with the maintenance of public order and tranquility. At the 
same time that he cedes control over public matters, he grows increasingly reliant on the 
state; and it is this dependence that Tocqueville most fears in the scenario of democratic 
despotism looming on the horizon. Existing in such a state of neediness is antithetical to 
Tocqueville’s republican conception of liberty, which proscribes the entrusting of great 
powers to any one authority. That is, liberty—understood most fundamentally as freedom 
not from coercion or interference but from dependence—is the decisive ingredient for a 
prosperous society, and it is precisely what democratic despotism promises to replace 
with a new, mild kind of servitude.  
 
A closer look at Tocqueville’s account of how democratic despotism can unfold and 
develop will provide a clearer understanding of his particular conception of liberty. We 
can begin by noting that the common affairs delivered to the state are not those that 
interest the country broadly, such as the formation of general laws, but rather everyday, 
local, administrative matters—establishing schools, building roads, maintaining parks—
that together form the wellbeing of a community. But it is the relinquishing of control of 
precisely these “small details of social order that make life pleasant and easy” that 
Tocqueville finds so troubling (155). For the participation in and accomplishment of 
small communal affairs not only gives the practice required for the free exercise of one’s 
will in larger, more urgent matters, but also draws citizens out of themselves and closer 
together, showing them in a practical way the tight bond that unites them. Equally 





among the citizens a kind of energy and vitality that, while sometimes unruly and 
imperfect in its efforts, is, in Tocqueville’s view, a necessary ingredient for the health and 
prosperity of a people. When the central government does not administer these small 
affairs, the only way that they are carried out is through the “free participation of wills,” 
which Tocqueville views as the only “true power” of a people (159). For compared to the 
“somnolence” that settles in the social body when control over public matters is ceded to 
the state, cooperative civic action creates an enterprising, resourceful, and self-motivated 
society, and instills in the people a patriotic sense of loyalty and attachment to their 
community (154). However, since each small affair on its own does not profoundly affect 
the strength of public virtue in a community, the spirit of citizenship disappears 
gradually; control over these seemingly petty matters is given away almost without 
notice.  
 
As if to imitate the slow and subtle descent of a society toward democratic despotism, 
Tocqueville quietly and only intermittently discloses how each constitutive element of 
democratic mildness can, over time, deprive society of the power of self-determination 
and thereby enervate its citizens. Somewhere in each account of the different components 
of mildness Tocqueville reveals his deepest fear about the possibility that the particular 
democratic tendency could develop into a lamentable vice. What unites and animates 
these concerns is Tocqueville’s vision of the conditions required for a flourishing 
democratic society, the most important of which are the solicitude for the common good 
and the energetic, rugged spirit engendered by a robust tradition of liberty.  
 
One of the first clear glimpses of these concerns is at the end of the discussion of the 
principal source of beliefs in America. Tocqueville asserts that the ubiquitous authority of 
public opinion has the capacity eventually to “extinguish” intellectual liberty. Creating a 
“new face of servitude,” he admits that the intellectual authority of the majority may 
become “too great” that it would “finally enclose the action of individual reason within 





species” (724). Of course, the expanding supremacy of public opinion does not directly 
cause citizens to resign care of small, local matters. But it does accelerate the process. 
Since the federal government is the clearest and most visible expression of the will of the 
majority, the greater the dominion of public opinion, the more the state will appear as the 
rightful bearer of all civic responsibilities. Yet the source and legitimacy of the central 
government’s power does not alleviate Tocqueville’s dismay: when he feels “the hand of 
power” threatening the freedom of his mind, “knowing who is oppressing” him matters 
little, and he is “no more inclined to put [his] head in the yoke, because a million arms 
present it” to him (725). 
 
Equally detrimental, Tocqueville fears, is the unchecked love of material goods. In 
one of the shortest chapters of the book, Tocqueville quietly discloses what can be lost as 
a society increasingly seeks the acquisition of material things. The ironic title sums up his 
point: “How the Excessive Love of Well-Being Can Harm Well-Being.” That is, the 
pleasure derived from material goods is merely a subset of the broader category of human 
satisfaction or happiness; when pursued without restraint the desire for the former 
threatens to impede the attainment of the latter. Implicit in this argument is a ranking of 
human goods and of human passions that lead to the pursuit of those goods. Tocqueville 
makes clear how he understands the basic sequence: “there are no material passions that 
we do not have in common with [the animals] and whose germ is not found in a dog as 
well as in ourselves” (963). Superior in rank are those pursuits that transcend, and 
perhaps even scorn, the goods of the body. These include all those aforementioned 
activities that are de facto excluded from the liberal “ordinary life”—among them the 
worship of the divine and the self-sacrifice demanded by the “warrior ethic”—as well as 
all those enterprises, however small, that serve the public good. Yet as we have already 
seen, human beings are unique in that we are guided in our pursuits, even the material, by 
our soul: “With man, the angel teaches the brute the art of satisfying himself” (ibid.). We 





but only the latter provide the rich, durable satisfaction that Tocqueville means by the 
general category of “wellbeing.”  
 
Moreover, whereas the pursuit of immaterial goods “elevates, enlarges, [and] expands 
the soul,” the inherently unsatisfying quest for material pleasures enervates and weakens 
the soul “for all things, the principal ones as well as the least ones, and threatens to make 
it almost as powerless for the first as for the second” (964). An enfeebled soul not only 
lacks the vigor to engage in those enterprises that seek satisfaction beyond the body, but 
it also can impede the pursuit of the bodily goods. Foreshadowing his cryptic 
characterization of a citizenry reduced to a timid flock of animals, Tocqueville says that 
people who reach this nadir, wherein they enjoy “without discernment and without 
progress” only material goods, lose access to the higher human goods, without which 
they are “like the animals” (964). A society dedicated to the acquisition of wealth 
sacrifices precisely what liberty aims to protect: an energetic spirit of citizenship and the 
ability to unite with one’s neighbors in order to undertake projects that, in transcending 
the wellbeing of any one individual, contribute to the common interest of society.  
 
It is not altogether clear if Tocqueville truly believed that human beings are capable 
of sinking to this final, dark endpoint of democratic despotism, this extreme debasement 
of society that resembles all too closely Nietzsche’s last-men. Yet the strength of his 
conviction is of little import. For in Tocqueville’s mind the different stages of democratic 
despotism vary only by the degree to which public liberty is sacrificed for tranquility and 
private prosperity. There is no doubt that even in his own age Tocqueville saw this 
alternative as matter of urgency and was conscious that his deep-seated desire to 
encourage the former and to forestall the latter determined his outlook on political 
matters. As he wrote to a friend, Sophie Swetchine, in January 1856: “I regard liberty as 





of manly virtues and of great actions. Neither tranquility nor well-being can take its 
place.”74  
 
Since Tocqueville presents many of the most threatening consequences of equality of 
conditions as having the potential, if left unchecked, to lead by way of an excessive love 
of public order to this democratic despotism, one can understand the alternative between 
liberty and tranquility as proceeding from a more fundamental tension between liberty 
and equality. To be sure, this tension is not between two mutually exclusive principles: 
favoring liberty does not make Tocqueville an enemy of equality. We have already seen 
that his reverence for political liberty does not preclude him from regarding equality as a 
benefit to society, for example, in its capacity as the most stable source of justice. 
However, this tension between liberty and equality seen at the core of Tocqueville’s 
thought does raise the question of how the two principles ought to coexist in a society. 
What, if any, should be the limits to the implementation of each? What does Tocqueville 
understand to be the moral obligations that proceed from his conceptions of liberty and 
equality, and how might they be at odds with one another?  
 
Because Tocqueville never provides a clear answer to any of these questions, we are 
forced to extract various pieces of evidence and try to fit them together. Perhaps the most 
illustrative clues on the question of the proper relationship between liberty and equality in 
a society can be found in two letters from his personal correspondence. Writing to John 
Stuart Mill in June of 1835, Tocqueville declares, “I love liberty by taste, equality by 
instinct and reason.”75 He sees and feels that there is some inherent and universal equality 
amongst human beings; we are drawn unconsciously, by our “instinct,” to love and value 
that fundamental similarity we share with all individuals of our species. Yet there is 
something impressive and admirable in liberty that he has grown to love only through 
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experience. In another letter written nearly twenty years later, again to Sophie Swetchine, 
Tocqueville affirms Ms. Swetchine’s conviction that an equitable allotment of goods and 
rights is “the greatest aim” of those who “conduct human affairs.” But he adds the 
following crucial qualification: “I would only wish that equality in politics consisted of 
everyone being equally free and not, as one hears so often in our days, of everyone being 
subjugated to the same master.”76 This passage illuminates Tocqueville’s view of equality 
that is at the heart of his republican notion of liberty: all human beings are equal in their 
claim to self-government, that is, to be free from dependence and from oppression.  
Yet as Pierre Manent explains, by codifying this natural equality, democracy “in no 
way theoretically dismisses natural inequalities.” Rather, it only “requires that they do not 
issue into individual influences that subject the weakest to the power of one who is more 
endowed by nature.” Manent helpfully brings to the fore the reality that “nature does not 
cease furnishing instances of inequality.”77 He thereby reminds us that, in order to 
understand Tocqueville’s conception of equality, one must consider his views of these 
man’s natural inequalities. Most powerful and evident for Tocqueville is intellectual 
inequality, which man can never completely eradicate since it “comes directly from 
God.”78 Thus, precisely because democracy is rooted in a fundamental, albeit limited, 
equality of human beings, it must continually veil or divert attention away from all the 
“sentiments, qualities, and actions,” springing out of nature, “that tend to contradict this 
equality.”79  
 
Tocqueville’s vision of the proper orientation of society provides for and respects 
both facts of human nature—that is, both our natural equality and our natural inequalities. 
Yet he understood clearly that history is always biased: in each century “a singular and 
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dominant fact is found to which the other facts are related.” He knew that the foreseeable 
future would be dominated by equality of conditions; the “principal passion” that will 
agitate men in the coming centuries will be “love of this equality.”80 Seeing the natural 
direction toward which most modern societies were bound to incline, and recognizing the 
inherent dangers of equality, Tocqueville was convinced that politics in his time must 
seek to combat the latent vices of democracy. Not surprisingly, he viewed the 
maintenance and strengthening of liberty as the essential antidote. For when a democratic 
people has the opportunity and the initiative to engage in local matters and political 
affairs, each individual becomes attached to the community at the same time that all 
people come to discern in a practical way the common interest that unites them. Engaging 
even in small matters revives the social bonds, the sense of mutual obligation between 
individuals, that equality of conditions erased. Tocqueville regarded these ties between 
citizens as among the necessary preconditions for a society to undertake the sort of great 
and sustained enterprises that provide a theater not only for society to act cooperatively 
and in unison, but also for individuals to exercise their natural merits and talents. 
Tocqueville’s conception of liberty thus served above all as the most effective means of 
enabling the most impressive natural inequalities among men to flourish. Refusing to 
bow to fatalism, he instead turned to foreign affairs as the best possible vehicle by which 
to accomplish his domestic goals. And in doing so, he believed the stakes to be even 
higher than reinvigorating a somnolent society: when a people no longer concern 
themselves with public matters, but only enjoy the benefits like a “usufructuary, without 
a sense of ownership and without ideas of any improvement whatsoever,” they are 
“prepared for conquest.” If such nations, populated not by citizens but by subject, “do not 
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Tocqueville’s Writings on Empire and Slavery 
 
In the summer of 1837, two years after he published the first volume of Democracy in 
America, Tocqueville ran unsuccessfully for a position in the French Chamber of 
Deputies.82 This first attempt at elected office was not, however, completely 
unproductive: in his effort to win a seat in the Chamber, he published two essays on the 
French colonial project in Algeria that catalyzed a decade-long engagement with this 
topic. Between 1837 and 1847 Tocqueville visited Algeria twice, wrote a careful study 
(not intended for publication) of the past and future of French policy in Algeria, and 
published two official reports to the Chamber (he won office in 1839). In the midst of his 
preoccupation with Algeria, he also wrote an article, published in 1843, calling for the 
emancipation of slaves in all French Caribbean colonies. In this section I will examine 
these writings in order to demonstrate how Tocqueville’s support for empire in Algeria 
and the emancipation of slaves in the French West Indies was rooted fundamentally in his 
conviction that these two projects would assist in combating the democratic vice of 
mildness that he saw developing in France.  
 
My general approach is not a novel one: there have been many scholarly works 
attempting to explain Tocqueville’s diplomatic career in terms of his hopes for improving 
the domestic condition of French society (cf. Richter, 1963; and Todorov, 1993). The 
central puzzle that most of this research seeks to clarify is the apparent tension running 
through Tocqueville’s diplomatic works between an ardent and patriotic support for harsh 
and violent tactics required by French imperial projects on the one hand, and the apparent 
moral tone, if not aim, of his arguments for the abolition of slavery on the other hand. 
Indeed, most scholars argue that Tocqueville’s ambivalence can be seen even within his 
writings on Algeria, claiming, for instance, that his essay on Algeria written in 1843, “the 
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most uncompromising of Tocqueville’s writings” on the subject, advocates for 
exceptionally cruel tactics that do not find support in his other reports.83  
 
I will take my bearings by the most compelling of these studies, Jennifer Pitts’ book, 
A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (2005). In 
doing so I will clarify as well as disagree with her central claim that the “ambivalence of 
Tocqueville’s writings” reflect his “anxieties about the difficulty of maintaining political 
engagement in France in an age of democratization,” which led him to support “the 
exercise of French power in Algeria” and to “ignore the claims of those France sought to 
dominate.”84 While this is a helpful starting point, Pitts’ thesis ultimately falls short for 
two key reasons. First, her explanation of the connection between Tocqueville’s foreign 
policy and his longings to improve the condition of the French social state goes no further 
than stating that Tocqueville regarded large-scale empires, and in particular the “glorious 
military conquest and prosperous settlement” they entailed, as among the only “arenas for 
grand political gestures in his day.”85 Second, Pitts’ claim that Tocqueville’s indifference 
toward the native inhabitants of Algeria contradicts his “deeply moral understanding of 
politics” rests on the dubious assumption that Tocqueville, in all his writings, including 
Democracy in America, and throughout his diplomatic career, was guided at various 
times by some objective other than the French national interest.86 In what follows below, 
I will address sequentially both of these weaknesses, demonstrating that they arise from 
the same source: namely, an inadequate consideration of the primacy of liberty in 
Tocqueville’s political views, ambitions, and hopes for French society.  
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There is no doubt that Tocqueville was greatly concerned with, and moved by, the 
status of French reputation among other leading international powers, especially Britain. 
Yet it is an exaggeration to say that this was Tocqueville’s only, or even primary, 
consideration. Moreover, Pitts never explicates how, according to Tocqueville, engaging 
in “grand political gestures” abroad would combat the pervasive apathy at home in 
France. For the colonial projects in Algeria did not require the kind of mass mobilization 
of troops that would jolt awake an enervated people with the threat of defeat at the hands 
of a larger, and more powerful enemy. Compared to a military engagement with another 
leading state, one could say that the material risks of colonial failure were relatively low. 
How then did Tocqueville believe colonial projects in Algeria would be an effective 
remedy against the domestic maladies developing in France?  
 
The answer is two-fold: first, establishing and maintaining colonies abroad provided 
the French government, and the public that elects them, the occasion to exercise a 
“definite and sustained will” on a long-term endeavor that, insofar as it symbolizes 
French prowess and strength, would encourage, or revive, a patriotic pride.87 In 
Democracy Tocqueville identified both of these potential effects of colonization as key 
antidotes to democratic despotism. Second, managing the affairs involved in directing a 
foreign colony necessarily educates the policymakers at home in good governance. Put 
differently, by attempting to found and preserve a new political community in Algeria, 
the government of France was able to conduct a kind of “experiment” to test different 
governmental arrangements and methods while observing the results from afar. 
Tocqueville considered it essential for a democratic government, like France, to have 
access to such a venue, for a group of people all held equal “can only gain the truth by 
experience,” and, as was true for the Native Americans, “many peoples cannot wait for 
the results of their errors without perishing.” Algeria thus represented in Tocqueville’s 
                                                 





mind the expansive frontier of America, which proved to be the “great privilege of the 
Americans” in that granted them “the ability to make mistakes that can be corrected.”88  
 
The first of these two benefits of colonization evinces Tocqueville’s awareness that 
the answer to the problem of democracy, in order to be effective, must occur on the level 
of democracy. “Tocqueville accepts equality,” Martin Zetterbaum notes, “and, with it, the 
individualism which is its inevitable accompaniment.” Knowing that any effort to 
struggle against the democratic revolution would be futile and foolish, Tocqueville 
understands that the “problem of democracy is to re-create a sense of public morality on 
the basis of equality and individualism.”89 During his travels to America, the most 
promising resolution was seen in the Americans’ application of what he called “doctrine 
of interest well understood,” i.e., the notion that, “out of an enlightened regard for 
themselves,” the citizens of a democracy “need constantly assist one another and sacrifice 
a portion of their time and wealth to the welfare of the state or community.”90 The 
doctrine of interest well understood can be thought of as a kind of enlightened 
selfishness, insofar as it “turns personal interest back against itself and, to direct the 
passions, uses the incentive that excites them. However, it is not the same as pure 
selfishness—it is not identical to the attitude that each individual serves his compatriots 
best in serving himself.91 The key difference is that out of “interest well understood” 
emerges a love of country and community: 
 
The common man in the United States has understood the influence that general 
prosperity exercises over his own happiness, an idea so simple and yet so little known 
by the people. He has, moreover, become accustomed to regarding this prosperity as 
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his work. So, in public fortune, he sees his own, and he works for the good of the 
State, not only by duty or by pride, but I would almost dare to say by cupidity.92 
 
 
Despite Tocqueville’s high esteem for this American habit of energetic work toward 
the common interest that emerges out of their liberty in small affairs, he was skeptical 
that such a remedy could arise organically in French society. However, during his first 
visit to Algeria, Tocqueville observed that the colonization project had had a similar 
effect. The ambition of the generals stationed permanently in Algeria, he notes, was 
“more enlightened and more contained than that of the generals who arrive from France 
only for a certain period.” Those in latter group, representing the society from which they 
came, were “more concerned with [their] personal glory than with the desire to do things 
most useful for the country.”93  
 
In the “Second Letter on Algeria,” written four years prior to his first visit, 
Tocqueville makes clear that the French goal of governing over its colonial possessions 
will require a sustained effort from the home country. “The sole object of our present 
concern should be to live in peace with those Arabs whom we cannot hope to govern at 
present, and to organize them in the manner least dangerous for our future progress.” 
That organization, Tocqueville emphasizes, does not entail the Arab population 
governing themselves. Even at this early stage of his involvement with the question of 
empire, Tocqueville asserts that the Algerian inhabitants, recently liberated by the French 
from Ottoman rule, do not have “an incontestable right to govern.”94 Moreover, 
Tocqueville implies in these remarks that the peaceful cohabitation with the Arabs is 
sought not for its own sake or out of sympathy for the native populations, but rather as a 
temporary means to the ultimate goal of French success. Tocqueville regarded pacific 
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relations with the Arabs as a necessary component of the broader strategy to deplete the 
territory and populations under control of the Abd-el-Kader, the chief rival to French 
domination of Algeria and a “puny young man” hailing from a family that “descended 
from Muhammad himself.”95 Indeed, Tocqueville took into consideration cohabitation 
with the Arab population only because they, unlike the Kabyles, the other native Algerian 
tribe, were sedentary and agricultural. While he never have reasonably expected the 
effects of colonization to influence every facet of French society, there is no doubt that 
the kind of prolonged and steady support, if not concerted effort, required to engage in 
such a long-term project would help combat the restlessness and shortsightedness of 
French legislators, citizens, and soldiers.  
 
If his early writings on Algeria display his emphasis on the need for an enduring 
colonial effort, Tocqueville’s later reports, published in 1847, demonstrate the way in 
which the French government can learn from the mistakes of its colonization 
“experiments.” In his “Second Report on Algeria” Tocqueville crafted a document that 
allowed the Chamber of Deputies to reflect on the previous decade of their endeavors so 
that that they “focus on the question of which method of colonization [they] should 
follow.”96 In his examination of several different colonial settlements, Tocqueville 
spotlights above all the grave dangers of administrative centralization. The single 
consistent cause of ruin in Algeria was the “daily influence” of the “inert and 
meddlesome” centralized administrative power that sought to intervene in and direct all 
the small affairs for the colonists. In these abandoned towns the French government had 
given the settlers “houses and fields,” but not “the means to live”: the colonists 
“languished and in the end would have died out, their hands still full of all the tools of 
prosperity they had been given free.”97 While these failed settlements certainly troubled 
Tocqueville, he hoped that they would demonstrate concretely to the Chamber of 
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Deputies the vices of a custodial administrative power. Having little faith that the people 
of France, who were “destitute of true passions,” would be able to apprehend the grim 
social consequences of administrative centralization, Tocqueville sought to reveal the 
material effects of such a government in order to arouse “a sincere taste for working for 
the general good.”98 
 
Perhaps the most striking example of Tocqueville’s effort to reawaken and 
reinvigorate the apolitical and individualistic social state of France can be seen in his 
essay, “The Emancipation of Slaves.” This work is also perhaps the most misunderstood 
of Tocqueville’s diplomatic career. Exemplifying this misinterpretation, Pitts adduces 
Tocqueville’s slavery articles as the only evidence necessary to substantiate her bold 
claim that he believed that “some universal moral standards should govern states’ 
international conduct.”99 At first sight, it is reasonable to expect that an article in support 
of the abolition of slavery would correspond with the belief in a cosmopolitan moral 
standard, as well as obligation, that binds the actions of sovereign states. Yet if one looks 
closely at Tocqueville’s exact arguments, it is far from clear that they implied such a 
belief. He summarizes his support for the “emancipation plan” proposed for the French 
Caribbean colonies as follows: “It would be difficult, it seems, to attain a greater goal at 
smaller cost, and to bring together any better the requirements of humanity and France’s 
interest with the commands of prudence.”100 While he certainly refers to the 
“requirements of humanity,” one must wonder if he held such requirements (however he 
defines them) to be more important than the other two concerns mentioned: French 
national interest and prudence. Insofar as he regarded the benefits of the French 
Caribbean colonies to be equal or similar to those of the Algerian colonial project, 
Tocqueville leaves us little room to doubt that, on the question of emancipation, his 
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primary interest was anything other than what was best for the future of France. For he 
understood that maintaining the status quo in the Caribbean colonies will most certainly 
cause their ruin: “if there is a way for France to keep [its colonies], it will come only 
from the abolition of slavery.”101 
 
Of course Tocqueville’s advocacy of emancipation contains more than a passing 
reference to humanity. Indeed, unlike any of his other works on foreign affairs, this essay 
is imbued with a moral, humanitarian tone. He speaks passionately of France reassuming 
its rightful place as the leading advocate of the “notions of freedom and equality that are 
weakening or destroying servitude everywhere.” Yet it is important to note that, for 
Tocqueville, this crusade is not wholly, or even primarily, moral. Above all he seeks to 
arouse the “glory” and “strength” of France that they first acquired not by originating the 
“Principles of 1789,” but rather by reawakening the work of the Christians and bringing 
“it into battle as an auxiliary.”102 It was precisely in this way that Tocqueville sought to 
make use of the emancipation of slavery: abolition was the only means by which to save 
the French colonies, which he regarded as necessary in the effort to combat the apathy 
and lassitude of French society. While he accepted the fact that democratic nations are 
condemned to remain outside “the great theater of human affairs,” because their fervent 
and shortsighted dedication to the acquisition of wealth precludes them from executing 
“vast plans,” Tocqueville insists that France must preserve the means of rising to these 
heights again in the future. “If we do not acquire remote new positions that would allow 
us easily to take a principal part in the approaching events,” Tocqueville exhorts his 
countrymen, “let us at least try to preserve those that we have prudently acquired.”103 
Tocqueville’s support for the abolition of slavery is thus rooted not in humanitarian 
concerns for the fate of the slave population, but rather in his conviction that 
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emancipation was an essential precondition for the future strength, power, and grandeur 
of France. 
 
This kind of misinterpretation of Tocqueville’s morality can be seen in studies of all 
of his works. For instance, Pitts argues that, in his “Essay on Algeria,” Tocqueville 
suggests that “French imperial activities must be governed by a concern for rights and 
international law.”104 In making this claim, Pitts refers to Tocqueville’s remark 
advocating the use of “all means” to desolate the native tribes in Algeria, excluding only 
“those condemned by humanity and by the law of nations.”105 Taken on its own, this 
asseveration certainly invites pause: how can Tocqueville at once speak so coldly about 
destroying the inhabitants of Algeria and invoke the sanctity of some transnational law 
that binds all sovereign states? Moreover, what actions exactly does this cosmopolitan 
law proscribe? Without claiming to know the precise limits of this law, Pitts argues that 
Tocqueville’s remark indicates that he “did believe that natural individual rights establish 
moral obligations and define the scope and requirements of international justice.”106 
While this interpretation appropriately captures the ideology of a statesman like 
Woodrow Wilson, or a philosopher like Immanuel Kant, it does not accurately reflect 
Tocqueville’s understanding of equality, liberty, and the moral obligations that arise from 
each. Only a few lines below the brief statement cited by Pitts, Tocqueville clarifies the 
ambiguity of his statement. Far from establishing obligations or imposing limits, the 
“right of nations,” by which Tocqueville means the “right of war,” grants extensive 
license. It “authorizes us to ravage the country,” a tactic Tocqueville explicitly endorses, 
“either by destroying harvests during the harvest season, or year-round by making those 
rapid incursions called razzias, whose purpose is to seize men or herds.”107 The great 
puzzle of Tocqueville’s career thus appears as superimposed by contemporary scholars, 
rather than as a paradox that he himself would have seen. That is, many studies are forced 
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to conclude that Tocqueville’s diplomatic career suffered from an intractable tension 
precisely because they insist on attempting to categorize him according to present-day 
academic standards and criteria. Rather than relentlessly asking ourselves how 
Tocqueville’s “liberalism” could ever be compatible with his “imperialism,” we are better 
off striving to understand the man as he would have understood himself: an observer as 
well as a practitioner of politics who sought to apprehend the world not only for the sake 









Conclusions and Implications 
 
 There is yet another reason that Tocqueville’s foreign policy is so often 
misunderstood. The true line of reasoning that wove together his support for 
emancipation with his endorsement of obliterating entire tribes eludes our grasp not only 
because our twenty-first century academic jargon clashes with all subject matter deemed 
to be “classic.” Rather, seeking an equilibrium that unites Tocqueville’s works in a 
comprehensive and comprehendible whole can seem like a vain endeavor because he 
approached what we understand to be familiar topics—democracy, international 
relations, the abolition of slavery—from a perspective that is alien to our modern 
democratic minds. This Tocquevillean perspective is so unfamiliar to us that it escapes 
our notice; we do not know how to begin accounting for it because we do not recognize 
it. What makes it so foreign is its particular orientation toward life and toward politics, 
and its unique ranking of the various ends and means available to human beings.  
 
 Tocqueville disparaged those who trade patriotism and citizenship for public 
order and private prosperity. He feared those who sought peace for the sake of peace 
more than those who dreamt of conquest and loved war. He longed for “great events” and 
was perennially tired of “our little democratic and bourgeois pot of soup.”108 He 
sanctified the French national interest above all else; he assuredly would have resisted 
Woodrow Wilson’s exhortation that all “self-governing states must be willing at all times 
to act on the principle that ‘the peace of the world’ takes precedence over any national 
concerns, ends, or values of their own.”109 Yet Tocqueville’s resolute patriotism did not 
make him coldly indifferent to everyone but his fellow Francophiles. Indeed, he viewed 
his life and career largely in philanthropic terms. But he understood the word 
“philanthropy” in its strict sense. That is, he criticized the “childishness” of those who 
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call themselves “philanthropists” but instead “make almost ridiculous” the “sincere love 
of humanity.”110 For Tocqueville, philanthropy consists in leading “modern societies by 
degrees” to the point that “the majority of citizens [are] in a fit state for governing.” It 
was to this enterprise, “the only way to save them from barbarism or slavery,” that 
Tocqueville dedicated all of his “energy and will.”111 
 
 Tocqueville began this project by writing Democracy in America. Above all else, 
he intended his seminal book to instruct the future democrats regarding the “fatal circle” 
that “Providence” has circumscribed around them. Equality of conditions cannot be 
reversed, but, Tocqueville encourages, “it depends on them whether equality leads them 
to servitude or liberty, to enlightenment or barbarism, to prosperity or misery.”112 His 
dedication to this philanthropic cause also shaped his diplomatic career. Employed by the 
French Chamber of Deputies, but writing for all future generations of democrats, he used 
the lessons learned in Algeria to teach us that, although the military “from time to time 
undoubtedly uses quite a brutal measure of violence,” by far the “most oppressive and 
injurious power” was “the civil government.”113 For Tocqueville, violent conflict, which 
entails at least the possibility of death, is not the greatest evil to fear. If war and death are 
not the greatest evils, it follows that peace is not the greatest good. That this 
Tocquevillean ranking and perspective is alien to our contemporary sensibilities becomes 
evident when one considers the central tenets of modern liberal foreign policy. President 
Obama’s first major foreign policy speech, delivered in Cairo in 2009, accurately 
embodies this Kantian legacy. Speaking, as Wilson did, on behalf of a universal public 
opinion, President Obama enumerated the key commonalities shared by all human 
beings: “all of us share common aspirations to live in peace and security.” Moreover, 
there is global consensus regarding the purposes of that peace: “to get an education and to 
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work with dignity, to love our families, our communities, and our God.” And it is 
precisely these shared aspirations and goals that constitute “the hope of all humanity.”114 
 
 As we have already seen, Tocqueville differed greatly from Kant’s idealism, but 
that does not make him a jingoist. Rather, he insisted on holding humanity to a standard 
fit for the exercise of man’s highest and most impressive faculties. Eschewing “the 
ordinary life” that has dominated Western liberal societies, and accepting the 
disappearance of the “warrior passion,” Tocqueville’s enterprise aimed at maintaining an 
elevated middle ground. His goal was simple: to guide and inspire the future generations 
of democrats never to “relinquish the use of their free will” and always to employ 
whatever means necessary in its defense. For without liberty, one will fall “gradually 
below the level of humanity.”115 
 
If Tocqueville’s project is not puzzling, perhaps it seems anachronistic. Studying 
the past always runs the risk of eliciting this reaction. Yet we must consider the unique 
timing of Tocqueville’s life. Writing in 1837 to a friend, he describes having come “into 
the world at the end of a long Revolution, which, after having destroyed the old state, had 
created nothing durable.” He was born with neither aristocratic nor democratic 
prejudices. He had only the single passion of “the love of liberty and human dignity.”116 
These remarks reveal a critical feature of his life and of his time: an important place in 
political life and debate was occupied by questions regarding the definition of equality 
and its implications for governmental action, for liberal democracy was new to the world 
and its future uncertain. The rare timing of Tocqueville’s life, and his keen awareness of 
this fact, affords him an advantage of perspective unavailable today. Born in between the 
demise of one era and the birth of another, suspended over a turning point of the course 
of history, Tocqueville was able to view the sentiments and opinions of the societies 
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behind and in front of him more clearly than we can see either. Aristocracy is too foreign 
to understand and too ancient to remember. Democracy is too commonplace to see 
clearly; our complete immersion prevents us from achieving a critical distance necessary 
to understand objectively our prejudices. We therefore ought to leave open the possibility 
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